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Abstract 
Debates around water in the MENA region center on its potential for conflict or for cooperation, with 
predictions of future water wars. Water is presented as a natural resource or an economic or political 
commodity. The debate is mostly focused on the international, inter-state scale. In recent years, 
however, some scholars have argued that a focus on the national or local level would generate more 
interesting and useful research regarding the importance of water and water management. The 
Middle East is generally regarded as a very water-scarce and fragile region. Syria, that since the Arab 
Spring of 2010-2011 has been torn by civil war, is particularly interesting. Water scarcity and climate 
change have been mentioned in scholarly and popular discourse as possible factors for the Syrian 
population’s dissent. In this thesis I explore the theoretical and practical political dynamics of water 
within the paradigm of water as a tool for conflict or cooperation. Through an integrative historical 
framework I identify four possible political functions of water: water as a tool for diplomacy, 
development, democracy, or war. Political water management can be conducted at different scalar 
levels via pragmatic strategies that serve different political agendas. I argue that both the notion of 
relative availability of water and the appearance of pragmatic strategies in water management must 
be taken into account in the debate on water. Furthermore, through balancing theory and practice of 
Syrian water management, both abstract and concrete political dynamics are revealed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* On the front page the reverse sides of respectively five hundred and thousand Syrian pounds as 
issued by the Central Bank of Syria are shown. On the five hundred pound bill, hydrological 
infrastructures are visible. On the thousand pound bill agricultural and industrial practices are 
pictured. These bills may be regarded as an indicator for the importance the Syrian state attached 
to agriculture and its hydraulic mission.   
** I would like to express my gratitude to Jos de Sonneville of the SDWC for the extensive source 
materials he provided for this thesis. I would also like to thank Francesca de Châtel for her efforts. I 
am indebted to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for some unpublished policy papers that I was 
allowed to use. I am grateful to my second reader, Dr. Tsolin Nalbantian, for her feedback as well. 
And, naturally, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Crystal Ennis, for all her support, help, 
feedback, and time.  
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Introduction. Water as a weapon 
 
In June 2014, as the Islamic State (ISIS) rapidly advanced in Iraq and conquered Mosul, alarming 
messages about the consequences for Iraqi and Syrian water resources sounded. When the group 
briefly seized the Mosul Dam in August 2014, the United States backed an Iraqi and Kurdish 
operation to retake the dam. When the operation succeeded on August 18, president Obama 
mentioned that the breaching of the dam ‘[…] could have proven catastrophic, with floods that 
would have threatened the lives of thousands of civilians […].’1 Earlier in February that year, ISIS 
took over the Iraqi city of Fallujah and in April closed the gates of the Fallujah Dam in the Iraqi 
Western Anbar province. While this was probably meant to slow the water flow to the Shi’ite 
provinces in the south, it resulted in flooding a Sunni area nearby the dam, affecting around forty 
thousand people there.2 
This episode is quite instructive for the military use of water that has been happening in not 
only Iraq but particularly also in Syria. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in early 2011, Syria 
has steadily eroded into chaos with no clear solutions in sight. It is estimated that many of the 
hydrological infrastructures have been destroyed by the various forces on the ground. In the media, 
alarming cries about water becoming a tool of conflict resound. Both the Syrian regime and 
opposition forces are being accused of using water as a weapon. Monitors on the ground testify to 
the destruction of bridges and heavy fighting around dams. Since the advance of ISIS to Mosul and 
the broadening of the conflict to Iraq, the situation has become increasingly unclear and 
complicated.3  
Such messages raise questions about the uses and functions of water, other than as a 
natural resource. To what extent does water have a military or, broader, a political function? This 
question of political uses and functions of water is central to this thesis. The overarching research 
question, then, is how water can be regarded as a political tool in Syria. By coining the term “tool”, I 
mean to emphasize the possibility to use water in a strategic way by actors; to actively employ it to 
pursue a certain agenda or political purposes, using several instruments. The term “tool” 
consequently stresses the active political function of water, as well as the influence of human 
agency – rather than structural features – on water. Furthermore, by coining the question how 
water can be regarded as rather than used as a political tool, I emphasize that a theoretical approach 
is part of this research. At the same time, theory will be extensively mirrored to practice throughout 
this research.   
Before setting to systematically answer the main question, it is interesting to first conduct a 
closer examination of the alarming messages and analyze how or to what extent water has been 
and is being used as a weapon in Syria and by whom. An analysis of these messages and its 
messengers may provide insights into the broader question of political water use in Syria and in the 
wider region. Media and think tanks appear to be the key messengers regarding the military usage 
                                                          
1
 Washington Post, 7 October 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-state-jihadists-
are-using-water-as-a-weapon-in-iraq/2014/10/06/aead6792-79ec-4c7c-8f2f-fd7b95765d09_story.html (accessed 
10 February 2015). 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 See for example Reuters, Al-Jazeera English, The Guardian. 
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of water. Carnegie’s Middle East Center and Carnegie Endowment4 have dedicated several articles 
to the role of resource constraints in the conflict: the failing of power supplies and its effect on the 
Syrian population, the struggle of the regime with fuel and energy, the resource problems of 
opposition forces and their management of infrastructures. Chatham House5 has published an 
account of the cutting of water supplies in Aleppo, and attacks on water treatment plants around 
Hama and Homs. Several newspapers publish similar pieces on their websites or in print.6 
Important other sources are the writings of organizations with people or informants on the ground. 
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides useful updates on the situation in Syria and Iraq. 
The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) and the newsletters of the Syrian Opposition 
Coalition (SOC) are another source of information.7 
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW)8 is an American public policy think tank that writes 
regular updates on military and political developments on the ground in Syria and Iraq through 
reliance on both primary and secondary sources. Their monitoring of the evolvement of events is 
highly useful for examining the current military use of water in Syria. The updates, along with 
articles from media like Al-Jazeera English, The Guardian, and Reuters, offer a first line of inquiry 
regarding the political function of water: the question of the actor. Both the Syrian regime (the 
state) and non-state actors like rebel and Islamist groups seem to be involved in the military use of 
water. The Pacific Institute – a California-based leading institute in the research of water resources 
and sustainability9 – has formulated a split between different actors and their uses of water. State 
actors can use water either as a military tool or target; non-state actors can use water in acts of 
terrorism or domestic violence (including cyber terrorism); both state and non-state actors can use 
water in a development dispute.10 Following these lines, in the Syrian conflict water seems to be 
used both as a military tool or target and in acts of terrorism, as the following brief inquiry shows.  
The above-mentioned sources show that water has been used as a weapon in various ways. 
Some of the heaviest fighting has concentrated around water infrastructures like dams and bridges, 
                                                          
4
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is the oldest international affairs think tank in the United States and 
proclaims to be a centrist institution within the American political spectrum. It has a global network of policy 
research centers, of which Carnegie’s Middle East Center, based in Beirut, Lebanon is one. See 
http://carnegieendowment.org/about/.   
5
 Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a British independent policy institute. See 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/about.   
6
 See the articles of Y. Sayigh, “What Will Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State Do Next in Syria?”, Al-Hayat 20 
November 2014, available via http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/11/20/what-will-jabhat-al-nusra-and-islamic-state-
do-next-in-syria/hux4; Y. Sayigh, “The Assad Regime’s Political “Achilles Heel””, Al-Hayat, 11 December 2014, 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/11/assad-regime-s-political-achilles-heel/hwdw; A. Lund, “Cold Winter Coming: 
Syria’s Fuel Crisis”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 13 Oct. 2014 (all accessed 12 December 2014),  
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=56917; Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, “Islamic State Will Use Water 
as Weapon in Iraq, Syria”, 2 September 2014. See for an example of media reporting 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/water-war-syria-euphrates-2014757640320663.html. 
7
 See http://understandingwar.org/ (ISW),  http://sn4hr.org/ (SNHR),  http://www.etilaf.org/ (SOC). 
8
 The ISW describes itself on its website as a non-partisan, non-ideological organization focused on fact-based 
research; see http://www.understandingwar.org/research. The institute has sometimes been labeled as hawkish 
by media like The Washington Post.  
9
 See http://worldwater.org/about-us/.   
10
 P.H. Gleick and M. Heberger, “Water and Conflict. Events, Trends, and Analysis (2011-2012)”, The World’s Water 
8 (2013), 160. 
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whereby the infrastructures were either damaged or destructed, or used by one party as a strategic 
tool against the other. This does not necessarily remain confined to the intra-state level. Al-Jazeera 
reported in July 2014 that ISIS’ capture of the Tabqa Dam at Lake Assad and consequent water 
mismanagement resulted in a drastic fall in water levels. The group blamed this via online forums 
on Turkey, stating that it had ‘intentionally cut off the flow of the Euphrates River into Syria as a 
tool of war.’11 Moreover, Chatham research from June 2014 showed that both regime and 
opposition forces continuously target water supply networks and related structures to put its 
opponents under pressure. Aleppo, where many such incidents have occurred, is a good example. A 
water pumping station in Al-Khafsah stopped working in May, thereby cutting water supply to half 
of the city. According to Chatham, allegedly the Syrian regime ordered this to prevent the flow of 
water to ISIS territory. Earlier that month, Aleppo’s opposition-held main water pumping station 
was targeted when the regime attacked the al-Sakhour plant, which provides electricity to the 
station. Chatham reports that also in the same month, Jabhat al-Nusra (inadvertently?) cut off water 
to the city for nine days, when it tried to divert water away from regime-held areas.12 As a result of 
these actions, wastewater treatment facilities throughout the country have been destroyed and 
water has been severely polluted. Nouar Shamout, a Syrian civil engineer writing for Chatham, 
argues that ‘both Syria’s regime and opposition groups are in a state of denial: neither is responding 
to, or preparing for, a food and water crisis. All efforts are concentrated on fighting […].’13 
The newsletters and updates of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) of the past four 
months (December 2014 – April 2015) confirm this. Water or water-related issues are only 
mentioned three times throughout this period. On 16 December 2014, the SOC makes mention of an 
agricultural project sponsored and supported by the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) in rural 
Homs, that is to result in self-sufficiency in besieged areas where water and food are scarce due to 
cuts by the regime.14 On January 30, 2015, the SOC calls upon the United Nations to take action to 
relieve 300.000 civilians in Deir Az-Zor, who are under siege by ISIS. According to the SOC, ISIS 
blocked the entries and exits to the city and its food supply, and cut all communications, power, and 
water. The SOC stresses that this same policy is carried out by the Assad regime, particularly in Al-
Waer district in Homs, and Al-Ghouta in Damascus.15 On 19 February 2015, the regime’s cutting of 
the water supply and electricity in the Yarmouk Refugee Camp in southern Damascus is 
mentioned.16 The Syria updates on control of terrain and the situation reports of the ISW in the 
same period breathe similar images: the Syrian regime cutting supply lines in its encirclement of 
                                                          
11
 D. Chudacoff, Al-Jazeera, 7 July 2014. Available online via 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/water-war-syria-euphrates-2014757640320663.html  
12
 Ibid., N. Shamout, Chatham, “Syria Faces an Imminent Food and Water Crisis”, 24 June 2014 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/14959 
13
 Shamout, “Food and Water Crisis”. 
14
 Syrian Coalition’s Daily Newsletter, 16 December 2014. See http://www.etilaf.org/. The ACU is the humanitarian 
arm of the SOC. Its main task is to coordinate the humanitarian efforts by NGOs, UN bodies, and others in Syria. 
15
 Ibid., 30 January 2015. 
16
 Ibid., 19 February 2015. 
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Aleppo – the same tactic they used in the siege of the Old City of Homs 2011-2014 – and the seizure 
of bridges from ISIS by the Syrian Kurdish forces (YPG) and rebel forces.17  
Following these sources, a twofold image of the military use of water arises. On the one 
hand attacks on and fighting around infrastructures. On the other hand the cutting of water 
supplies. These usages of water as a weapon or as a military tool are international “attention 
grabbers”. An analysis of these usages provides some information on the complex situation on the 
ground in the Syrian conflict, as has been showed. But a broader approach of the use of water must 
be adopted to grasp its meaning and impact. The how and why of the military use of water by both 
state (the Syrian regime) and non-state actors (ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, rebel forces) cannot be 
separated from the background of political water management in Syria as well as in the wider 
MENA region.  
In this thesis I explore this topic of political water use by arguing that water can be regarded 
as a political tool in Syria in various ways. In the existing literature, water is often regarded as 
either a natural resource or an economic commodity. But its political function and potential are 
particularly important, as I will argue. While non-state actors play an important role in the use of 
water as a weapon, in the question of water as a broader political tool the Syrian state is the first 
actor that must be examined, before taking into account other, non-state actors. To explain this 
selection and the structure of my research, an initial exploration into the literature and the role and 
meaning of water in the Middle East is needed. 
 
  
                                                          
17
 Institute for the Study of War, “Syria Update”, 9-16 December 2014 and “Control of Terrain in Syria”, 9 February 
2015. See for the most recent updates http://iswsyria.blogspot.nl/?utm_source=Syria+Update:+December+9-
16,+2014&utm_campaign=ISW+New+Syria+update&utm_medium=email.   
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Chapter 1. Water in the Middle East – an introduction to the research 
 
How have the functions of water and water management been presented in scholarly literature? 
Sussex professor of International Relations Jan Selby provides a good introduction to the debate on 
the larger question of water geopolitics in the Middle East.18 He argues that there are several ways 
in which water issues in the MENA region are represented in Western media and academia. 
Generally, he argues, the discourse is one of water as a commodity of ‘[…] immense though 
generally under-recognized geopolitical significance.’19 On the one hand, this results in theses about 
water wars in media, political, and popular circles. On the other hand, those who Selby labels 
“liberal functionalists” argue that water and water scarcity have an important role in nurturing co-
operation. Therefore, either way, ‘the implicit assumption is that water shapes, or can be employed 
to help reshape, the geopolitics of the entire Middle East.’20 The dominant paradigm is that water 
can lead to either conflict or cooperation. 
Indeed, most literature and policy briefs on water in the MENA region seem to – either 
implicitly or explicitly – adhere to one of these ideas. The debate about water and water scarcity is 
framed within certain disciplinary boundaries: environmental studies and (geo)politics and conflict 
studies. Three influential discourses dominate popular and scholarly discourse: the ecological, 
technical, and political discourse.21 
 
1.1 Three discourses 
 Ecological discourse 
In the first discourse, the image of water as a scarce and finite natural commodity prevails. In the 
debate on scarcity, this has been termed neo-Malthusianism; a rather static view of nature centered 
on the limits of natural resources. This view neatly fits within the boundaries of the environmental 
and conflict frames, and is prevalent within popular discourse, as many alarming environmental 
reports testify.22  
The scarcity discourse is often dominant in connection to the Middle East. Environmental 
issues appeared first on the international political agenda in the early 1970s, and concern about 
conflict over resources has increased since then.23 At the end of the twentieth century, there was a 
widespread sentiment among both academics and international institutions alike that international 
pressures over water were likely to increase in the MENA region in the near future. A 1995 World 
Bank Report titled “From Scarcity to Security. Averting a Water Crisis in the Middle East and North 
Africa” opens as follows: 
                                                          
18
 See J. Selby, “The Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East: fantasies and realities”, Third World Quarterly 26.2 
(2005) 329-349. 
19
 Ibid., 330. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 G.R. Trumbull IV,  “Speaking of Water”, Middle East Report Vol. 40 nr. 254 (Spring 2010). Available via 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer254.   
22
 See T.F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton 2001) for an overview of ‘two centuries of 
debate’, 28-48. 
23
 N.P. Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature”, Journal of Peace Research 
35.3 (1998), 382. 
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Water is widely distributed around the globe. In fact, 
 Over 70 percent of the earth’s surface is covered with water. 
 97 percent of all water is in the world’s oceans as unusable salt water. 
 Of the remaining 3 percent freshwater: 
 87 percent is locked in ice caps, glaciers, the atmosphere, soil, or 
deep aquifers; 
 Only about 13 percent (0.4 percent of all water) is usable. 
 And of that, less than 1 percent is in the Middle East and North Africa.24 
 
In the foreword of the report it is stated that the perceived vicious downward spiral of water 
availability in the region ‘would spell disaster’.25 The adoption of a regional perspective and 
national and international partnerships are acutely needed to address the water scarcity.26 The 
director of the earlier-introduced Pacific Institute, Peter Gleick, makes in a 1994 article a similar 
plea for the implementation of an international water law and institutions to counter growing 
pressures.27 Natural scarcity is the most important underlying notion of the reports and articles 
published within this vein. Water is thus mostly regarded as a natural resource here. John Cooley, 
an American journalist and foreign correspondent even stated in an article in 1984 that ‘the Middle 
East’s problems of water and agriculture stem fundamentally from its climate, not from its politics. 
[…] The scarcity of water has weighed upon the region’s life since prehistoric times.’28 On a different 
note, Gleick argues that water scarcity has influenced political relationships in the region for 
thousands of years: ‘no region has seen more water-related conflicts than the Middle East, and 
some of these go back more than 5000 years to the earliest civilizations in Mesopotamia.’29  
In more recent years, scholarly predictions of international water wars have decreased, but 
they have been replaced within this discourse by increased emphasis on (human-induced) climate 
change and its possible consequences for the region. Climate change would lead to more frequent 
and harsher droughts, higher temperatures, and lower and more irregular rainfall and precipitation 
levels. It has also been determined as a “threat multiplier” within societies, exacerbating other 
(negative) trends.30 Thus, recent reports argue that ‘even in the absence of clear-cut “water wars” 
so far, there are strong links between water mismanagement, the impacts of climate change, and 
risks of social and political instability.’31 And ‘“water wars” are not around the corner, but the havoc 
                                                          
24
 World Bank Report, “From Scarcity to Security: Averting a Water Crisis in the Middle East and North Africa” 
(December 1995), i. 
25
 Ibid., ii. 
26
 Ibid., 22. 
27
 P.H. Gleick, “Water, War & Peace in the Middle East”, Environment (1994), 15, 39. 
28
 J.K. Cooley, “The War over Water”, Foreign Policy 54 (1984), 5. 
29
 Gleick, “Water, War & Peace”, 7. See also M.E. Morris, “Water and Conflict in the Middle East: Threats and 
Opportunities”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 20.1 (1997), 1-2 for some – in hindsight – interesting possible 
1998 and 2005 scenarios. 
30
 P.H. Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria”, Weather, Climate, and Society (2014) 11-13; 
B. Pohl et. al., Report Climate Diplomacy (collaboration German Federal Foreign Office and Adelphi, a Berlin-based 
think tank), “The Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy. Strengthening Foreign Policy for Transboundary Waters” (PRINTPRINZ 
GmbH 2014), 9. 
31
 Pohl et. al., “Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy”, 6. 
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wrought by climate change and poor water management upon the ordinary people of the Middle 
East could be no less tragic.’32 What is visible here, is that climate change – linked to ecological and 
natural scarcity – is often connected to water management. This shifts the emphasis from a 
structural factor – the enduring feature of water scarcity – to an emphasis on (human) agency – 
scarcity due to human activities. The emphasis on human agency is characteristic of the second and 
third discourse. In this thesis, while not ignoring the influence of structural (ecological) scarcity, 
water will predominantly be regarded as something that can be influenced by human activities, 
thus tending towards agency rather than structure. 
 Technical discourse 
The technical or economic discourse – also known as the liberal-technical paradigm – is a second 
dominant stream within the debate, in which water is mostly regarded as an economic 
commodity.33 Selby argues that in this discourse resources are ‘[…] material social constructs and 
products, brought into being through economic and technological development, through the fact 
that humans are producers and not just consumers of ‘nature’ […].’34 In this regard, an amount of 
human responsibility is assumed rather than environmental or natural determinism. A lack of 
water thus becomes a result of inefficiency or mismanagement. The malleability of nature and 
human influence are principles on which the technical discourse – as well as the third (political) 
discourse – build.35 Prevalent within these “economic optimists” is the idea that innovation and 
properly functioning (economic) institutions could contribute to an alleviation of or perhaps even 
an end to water crises. International institutions like the World Bank encourage this view.36 The 
technical discourse that sees water as an economic commodity, then, breathes a more positive, 
neoliberal view that tends towards cooperation rather than conflict over non-renewable resources.  
What is particularly interesting in the technical discourse is the emphasis put on innovation. 
This touches upon the question of availability of water resources: if techniques can enlarge the 
availability of or even create water resources, ecological and geographical factors become less 
influential. In this regard, we can speak of what I term “relative availability” of water. Water 
availability depends not just on environmental matters, as the ecological discourse propagates, but 
on human agency as well. This leads to the third discourse. 
 Political discourse 
The third discourse assumes a Marxist political economical or “distributionist” view that 
contradicts the previous neoliberal technical view. Within this discourse, scarcity is considered to 
be a result of the maldistribution of resources and wealth and the inability of social and political-
economic structures to address these problems, including water. Water is in this discourse linked to 
power asymmetry and can be used as a political tool by “haves” against “have-nots”.37 The focus 
                                                          
32
 J. Sowers and C. Toensing, “Editor’s Note”, Middle East Report 40.254 (Spring 2010). Available via 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer254.   
33
 Trumbull, “Speaking of Water”. 
34
 Selby, “Geopolitics”, 332. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid., 333; Homer-Dixon, Environment, 28. 
37
 Selby, “Geopolitics”, 333; Trumbull, “Speaking of Water”, MER254. 
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within this discourse is on political dependencies and water allocation. Rather than is the case with 
the ecological or the technical discourse, in practice this can lead to both conflict and cooperation 
within states.38 And the political discourse is closely intertwined with water management. 
This leads to the essence of this thesis. Sowers argues that ‘water […] flows depend upon 
government policies and infrastructure, economic purchasing power and other factors not 
reducible to physical scarcity.’39 In accordance with this, I argue that water management underlies 
all three discourses, and that human activities and agendas are highly important factors regarding 
water and its potential for conflict or cooperation. The technical and political discourse view water 
as a commodity that can be used in various ways. The ecological discourse focuses more on scarcity 
and the presence or absence of water. But also within this discourse arguments about scarcity are 
increasingly coupled to water management and water policies.40 This shifts the focus from water as 
a natural resource to the potential of water as a political instrument.  
In this thesis, I operate across the discourses. Through accepting the notion of water that 
comes forward in the three discourses, I posit that water can indeed be regarded as either an 
ecological, economic, or political commodity, but that it is politicized through these discourses – the 
manner in which water resources are presented serves a certain aim. The argument is consequently 
not so much aimed at expressing judgments on the accuracy of these discourses. Rather, the aim is 
to analyze how political agendas underlie each of these discourses. How can water be regarded as a 
political tool – be it in its capacity of scarce and finite natural resource, be it in its capacity of 
renewable technical product? How is water management by different actors politicized? 
Literature on water management and water governance has pointed to the state41 as the 
official authority in water-related matters.42 But it has also increasingly emphasized that water 
management involves more actors than governmental ones. In the introduction, different actors in 
the military use of water already came to the fore. In the coming chapters, water management with 
the Syrian state as actor will form the starting point of the research, but other actors will also be 
taken into account. Alongside the different actors, diverse scalar levels at which water management 
takes place – the international, the national and local, and the global level – will be examined. 
 
1.2 Research design 
Following the here outlined discourses, water problems in the Middle East exist because of natural 
limits, technical flaws, or structural political, social, and economic societal deficiencies. They can 
lead to either conflict or cooperation. Subsequent to this fragmentation of the discourses, 
discussions on water and water management are divided across different disciplinary fields. The 
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groundwork for the study of water in the Middle East lies mostly within the boundaries of 
environmental studies, whereas the implications of water scarcity relate to the field of (geo)politics. 
Little are these two fields – their theories, methods, empirical studies, implications – integrated; 
research often remains fragmented between the disciplines.43 In this thesis I suggest an alternative 
philosophical approach. I explore the use of water as a political tool from a historical angle, 
incorporating the different disciplines. Using the work of Fernand Braudel as a philosophical 
reference, I aim to show how a historical approach towards a political focus can be an all-
encompassing one, incorporating the different disciplinary fields that are at stake. 
A political focus that alternates theoretical and practical approaches also provides the 
opportunity to research the topic of water and water management in the MENA region at the 
international and global as well as the national and local level. The literature discussed earlier is 
predominantly focused on water scarcity and water management in the entire region. Other 
literature focuses on the national or local level but omits a wider perspective.44 The different scalar 
levels are not often linked together.45 However, if both the larger and the smaller levels are included 
in a more integrative approach, new ways of political water use may be unveiled.  
 A historical approach 
A historical approach is at the basis of the proposed research. Naturally, research on water in the 
Middle East has already been conducted from a historical angle. The Pacific Institute, for example, 
has an interesting and long chronology of water conflicts on its website, ranging from the earliest 
water dispute in the Middle East dating back as far as 2500 BC (between Lagash and Umma, in 
current Iraq, whereby water flows were diverted and water supplies were cut off) to recent clashes 
between the Iraqi army and the militants of the Islamic State around the Haditha Dam.46 Despite 
being highly interesting their research does not succeed in capturing the entire historical picture 
because of its main focus on conflict situations. Literature on power (asymmetry) and negotiations 
frequently employs a historical perspective as well, mixed with more contemporary cases set 
within a designated area – mostly inter-state level – and period.47 This literature also tends to focus 
on historical heights and lows. It should not be dismissed, but a broader historical outlook must be 
adopted. 
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As the introduction to the literature indicated, the topic of water in the Middle East touches 
upon many different subjects, disciplines, and discourses. My aim is to integrate these into a single 
historical approach centered on the question how water can be used as a political tool – in past and 
present times. From a mosaic to a melting pot, incorporating the paradigm of scarcity, but also 
moving beyond it. Once again, the emphasis in this thesis is on active political agendas that render 
water a tool that can be used.   
Therefore I turn to Fernand Braudel and his famous work The Mediterranean and the 
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.48 In this work, which is divided into three parts, Braudel 
offers an interesting division of levels of history. The first part of his book is about the history of 
man in relation to the environment; ‘[…] a history in which all change is slow, a history of constant 
repetition, ever-recurring cycles.’49 This level of history is closely connected to geography. Braudel 
argues that geography can help to discover structural realities, in contrast to ‘history [that] usually 
only concerns itself with the crises and high points of these slow movements.’50 
On a second level, there is the history of groups and trends; social history, more concerned 
with social structures and closer to the individual. This history combines ‘[…] what have come to be 
known as structure and conjuncture, the permanent and the ephemeral, the slow-moving and the 
fast. These two aspects of reality […] are always present in everyday life, which is a constant blend 
of what changes and what endures.’51 
Finally, a third scale of history to complete the picture is the history of events and of the 
individual. Braudel warns of this histoire événementielle that ‘[…] it is the most exciting of all [but] 
we must learn to distrust this history with its still burning passions, as it was felt, described, and 
lived by contemporaries whose lives were as […] short-sighted as ours.’52 By solely examining 
events within history, the selectivity and perspective of the historian may become too dominant for 
a thorough historical explanation. Transported to the introduction, if we only examine the military 
use of water in Syria, we limit ourselves to this histoire événementielle. 
Braudel is indebted to the ideas and works of the École d’Annales – scholars like Bloch and 
Febvre – and works in their tradition.53 The famous British historian Trevor-Roper argued in his 
1972-comment on Braudel’s work that the greatest achievement of the Annales School was the 
integration of disciplines like geography, sociology, and law into the stream of history.54 Their 
philosophy was to grasp the totality of a certain history. The famous philosopher of history Thomas 
Kuhn argued that history, ‘[…] if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology’55, 
could provide scientific transformation and progress by breaking through paradigms. These broad 
approaches correspond to my intention to provide a thorough and fuller narrative to explore the 
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issue of water as a political tool in Syria, incorporating both a theoretical and a practical approach 
to the matter. 
 Structure of the research 
How does this mold into a structured research? It appeared that the dominant paradigm is one of 
water as a tool for either cooperation or conflict. I will explore the question of political water use 
and management within this paradigm. Braudel’s integrative history will serve as an underlying 
philosophy. First, a brief introduction to Syria and its geography and contemporary history will be 
provided in chapter two. Subsequently, within the paradigm of conflict or cooperation water is 
politicized in various ways at various scalar levels by different actors, and the chapters are set up 
accordingly. Alongside these levels water can be used for different political purposes. Water can 
serve as a tool for diplomacy for the Syrian state, as will be explored in chapter three. I will examine 
the Syrian politicizing of water management through the political discourse at the international 
level. Water can also serve as a tool for development for the Syrian state through the ecological 
discourse. The developmental function has mainly been studied in connection to the broader theme 
of state building, but much less so in studies with a particular focus on water.56  
In this regard, it is also important to briefly mention the connectedness between water and 
energy, termed the water-energy nexus.57 The politicizing of water is often related to security; 
water is connected to possible vulnerabilities and risks, as the larger paradigm of conflict or 
cooperation also indicates. Sowers argues that energy supply, its growing demand, and its effect on 
water consumption are an increasing concern in the MENA region. Yet on the other hand, states 
defend their (often unsustainable) water practices in terms of development: providing energy for 
its citizens.58 Therefore, water management must be regarded in connection to the electricity sector 
and energy management – and both are thoroughly intertwined with questions of (national and 
international) security. Although this nexus cannot be explicitly taken into account in this thesis, 
one must bear this connection in mind while reading throughout.  
In chapter 4, I will examine Syrian political water management at the national and local 
level via a case study. Third, water may serve as a tool for democracy. In my fifth and final chapter I 
will examine the politicizing of water through the technical discourse at the global level, via a 
critical examination of international agendas.  And finally, as already has been analyzed, water can 
also be used as a military tool by both the state and non-state actors. This happens at the level of 
the history of events. As Braudel already warned, it is important not to limit oneself to this level of 
history. The exploration into the military use of water in Syria in the beginning of this introduction 
showed the shortcomings of an analysis based solely on the histoire événementielle. Such an account 
obscures larger trends and underlying meanings and backgrounds.   
 
 Methodology and demarcations 
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Some methodological and philosophical remarks need to be included here. The German historian 
Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) posed that historians needed to understand, explain, and narrate 
history “as it really was” by putting themselves in the place of their subjects of study.59 For integral 
history writing the historian’s mind and ideas in the present must be taken into account. 
Concretely, with regard to Syria this means avoiding too heavy judgments from hindsight. Besides, 
it also means accounting for the fact that the study of the Middle East has been fraught with 
controversies and disputes over approaches, interpretations, and methods. Imagery, essentializing, 
and othering have heavily informed and influenced dominant paradigms and knowledge 
production on the region.60 One must not be oblivious to this. In this research, almost all of the used 
sources emanate from European or American scholars and journalists. Other materials have been 
written in cooperation with organizations like the UN. Consequently, these sources cannot be and 
are not free of some built-in biases. 
In this thesis I mainly conduct qualitative, inductive research. Because of the current situation 
in Syria I could not conduct fieldwork for this thesis. Therefore I am more dependent on the works 
of others and the fieldwork that I can do in situ. The focus on relatively topical issues renders it a 
challenge to find sources and collect data.61 The research is built upon the use and analysis of 
secondary literature and reports, updates, and newsletters. Moreover, I rely on two main bodies of 
materials: for my case study I use documents from the Syrian-Dutch Water Cooperation (SDWC), a 
cooperation between Dutch companies and the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation. Furthermore, I use 
published as well as unpublished documents from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Additionally, my talks to two experts who have worked in Syria provided me with background 
information and a glimpse into the situation in the country before the current crisis.  
Geographically, Syria will be the focus of this thesis. Syria is not only an interesting country 
because of the current situation; also, Syria’s water management has among some scholars been 
regarded as indicative for the rest of the region.62 The nation-state as ‘the assumed space of all 
social scientific inquiry’63 may be a somewhat outdated idea in history. But because of the focus on 
politics it is useful here. The national context is central in this thesis, and the politicization of water 
via various scalar levels must be regarded within this context. Because of this focus on one specific 
country, comparative research vis-à-vis other countries in the region must unfortunately be left out. 
Nevertheless, additional (comparative) research into for example the Saudi Arabian water policies 
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aimed at state-building, or an integration of this analysis with the role of water in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict would in a beneficial way complement the research here.  
Temporally, the focus will be on Syria’s contemporary history: the second half of the 
twentieth century (1960-2000) and the following period (2000-2010) up until the current crisis. 
When examining the political dimensions of water and water management, solely taking into 
account the current crisis is too short-sighted. This could already be seen in the analyses of water as 
a weapon, that are often limited to the period since the outbreak of the crisis, or at best include the 
situation in Syria a couple of years before the uprising. 
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Chapter 2. Narrowing the scope: a history of Syria 
2.1 Geographical history 
 
Figure 2. Syria and its water resources and irrigation zones, FAO Aquastat. 
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Before analyzing international and national water management in Syria, an exploration of the 
geography and (recent) history of the country is required. The long-term geographical history 
forms the starting point of this chapter, for ‘geography has shaped Syria’s historical fate.’64 Due to 
its strategic location between three continents, and its varying geographical features – plain, desert, 
oasis, mountain – the country has historically been fragmented. Syria has an arid to semi-arid 
climate in the east, north, and south, and humid zones in the west, along the Mediterranean coast. 
There are broad variations in annual precipitation and a large seasonal variety in available water 
resources. Droughts form an integral part of the climate; it has been estimated that from 1961 to 
2009 Syria experienced nearly 25 years of drought.65 Regarding surface water, Syria has five agro-
ecological zones depending on rainfall, and can be broadly divided into seven hydrological basins: 
Barada and Awaj, Al-Yarmouk, Orontes, Dajleh and Khabour, Euphrates and Aleppo, Desert, and the 
Coastal Basin (see also figure 2 for water resources and irrigation zones). It has 21 main rivers, 
some of them now seasonal, and twelve of them are shared with other countries.66   
Climate change in Syria – and in the Middle East in general, as already mentioned – has in a 
growing number of studies been marked as an alarming development. While the predictions in 
these studies certainly are worrisome, they also remain very general, with wide ranging and 
contradicting numbers. For example, the estimates of reduction of the Euphrates River flow in 
climate models vary as much as 29 to 73 percent, depending on factors ranging from rain fall to 
peaceful water allocation between the riparian countries Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.67 Nevertheless, 
different drought indices have indicated a changed drought frequency and intensity, in which 
climate change may play a role.  
Studies on the connections between possible climate changes and international security and 
conflict issues that have appeared in the past decades have suggested that climate change could 
have significant geopolitical impacts.68 In the case of Syria – and, for that matter, the broader Arab 
Spring – it has been suggested that climate change played a role in the uprising.69 From 2006 until 
2011 there was a very severe drought in northeastern Syria, triggering a humanitarian crisis with 
large-scale migration and widespread malnutrition. Eventually, this resulted in displaced and 
impoverished populations in the cities, fuelling discontent and sparking the uprising.70 This line of 
argument, however, is too much centered within the ecological discourse and largely ignores the 
role of human agency: the Syrian state and other actors. Domestic political developments, such as 
the lifting of subsidies on oil and energy, had by the time the drought struck resulted in rendering a 
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large part of the population socio-economically vulnerable.71 The connections between climate 
change, water management, and the Arab Spring are a slippery slope. It is not the aim of this thesis 
to speculate about or indicate all the factors that led to the Arab Spring and the current situation. 
Climate change may indeed have functioned as a “threat multiplier” here. But rather than trying to 
indicate a direct causal connection between water mismanagement, climate change, and the 
revolution, which has already been the focus of recent international research72, the different 
possibilities of political water management and their historical and geopolitical backgrounds need 
to be examined to advance the research.  
 
2.2 A brief introduction to contemporary political-economic history73 
 
A great many academic works have been written on the modern and contemporary history of the 
Middle East and Syria. Syria has a long and fascinating history to which this thesis unfortunately 
cannot do justice. Its contemporary political history does, however, offer a convenient starting 
point for picking up the narrative threads of Syrian water management: the coming to power of 
Hafez al-Assad.  
Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970 and remained president until his death in 2000, after 
which he was succeeded by his second son Bashar. During his presidency, Hafez al-Assad 
established an authoritarian regime in Syria, with his power based on the military and the Ba’th 
party, which he had helped bringing back into power by a coup in 1963.74 The Ba’th party was 
founded in the early 1930s by two Syrian students in Paris, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, who 
formulated a vision of Arab unity and a single Arab nation, combining aspects of nationalism and 
socialism.75 It became a formal party in 1946, at the time of Syrian independence, and the party 
attracted young Arabs in and beyond Syria. It briefly formed a union with Egypt – the United Arab 
Republic (1958-1961) – and an offshoot of the Syrian parent party exercised increasing powers in 
Iraq, eventually culminating into the presidency of Saddam Hussein. 
In 1966 Assad and his young officers purged the Ba’th party of many of its original 
supporters, including Aflaq and Bitar, and Assad became Minister of Defense and commander of the 
Syrian air force. Notwithstanding the Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in the June War of 1967, 
Assad managed to gain control over all aspects of the Syrian democracy. In early 1971 he was 
elected to a seven-year presidency. He set up institutions for political participation and introduced 
a new constitution. However, it has been argued that in reality political control, indoctrination, and 
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nepotism – bringing the Alawite community from an impoverished and isolated position into power 
– were his most important instruments.76 Assad consolidated his authority through party ideology, 
bureaucratic organization and control, and a combination of coercion and surveillance. Hinnebusch 
has argued that by incorporating a wide range of interests the regime succeeded in providing itself 
with a broad cross-class, urban-rural social base.77  
The American historians Cleveland and Bunton argue that the Arab defeat by Israel in the war 
of 1967 led to largely similar regimes in Syria and Iraq, with the big exception being the contrast in 
national wealth due to oil revenues.78 In the 1970s Syria flourished economically, but could 
eventually not sustain it. Capital flowed into Syria after 1973 due to the oil boom and Arab Aid after 
the October Arab-Israeli war. Government spending increased heavily, and public sector projects 
were established in many economic sectors. Efforts were undertaken by the regime to promote 
development by managing agricultural production – the Syrian economy was largely agricultural 
based at the advent of Assad’s power. The regime embarked on a top-down bureaucratic 
agricultural development strategy, supervised by technocrats. Development was, however, strained 
by corruption and a lack of coordination among the different ministries.79 Priority was given to 
establishing food self-sufficiency and the improvement of peasant living conditions through land 
reform. Among others, irrigation systems were developed and damming projects were initiated.80 
The Tabqa Dam project and its reservoir Lake Assad – initiated in 1968-69 and completed in less 
than ten years – in the Euphrates basin was the largest and most expensive project of this era. It 
aimed to bring electricity to remote villages and to double Syria’s irrigated land area. In its wake, 
towns like Tabqa, al-Thawra, and Raqqa experienced an enormous boom, while at the same time 
72.000 people were displaced from their homes by the new lake Assad.81  
In the 1970s and 1980s patterns of economic change became visible. By the mid-1980s Hafez 
al-Assad embarked on a gradual liberalization of the economy, moving from state-centered 
economic policies to increased economic pluralism.82 Bassam Haddad, director of Middle East 
Studies at George Mason University, has in his book Business Networks in Syria critically outlined 
these ‘shifting alliances from labor to business.’83 In a nutshell, he argues that Syrian economic 
liberalization went hand in hand with the bolstering of the public sector rather than official 
privatization. The Syrian state’s underlying agenda must be regarded through a security prism: 
moderate concessions from the side of the regime were made for the purpose of preserving its 
autonomy and rule.84 By reaching out to the Sunni-dominated urban private sector, Assad 
succeeded in partly legitimizing his Alawi rural nationalist-socialist regime. Through strategic 
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regime selections of the private sector, loyal economic networks developed in which the state still 
controlled much of the private sector assets.85 
 Haddad is critical of the consequences of economic liberalization: unemployment, removal of 
subsidies, erosion of social security, fragmentation among the state’s institutional structures. He 
argues that the Syrian government increasingly intensified its trade off, that consisted of 
‘compromising the state’s infrastructural and administrative power for the sake of preserving its 
decisional and coercive power […]’.86  This “security prism” as a political frame repeatedly returns 
in Syrian domestic politics. Indeed, political and social repressions were common under Hafez al-
Assad, with the intelligence services forming an important and even integral part of everyday 
Syrian life. Particularly after popular revolting and protesting in several Syrian cities and the 
infamous showdown by the regime of the revolt in Hama in 1982, control and repression became 
important tools to stem any unrest.87  
 
 Water as a weapon –  the 1982 Hama revolt 
 
It is interesting to draw a brief historical parallel here with the military use of water as examined in 
the opening of this thesis. Most of the sources on the military use of water do not move beyond the 
current situation and conflict, thereby by-passing the larger context of the use of water as a military 
weapon in Syria. Examining whether water was used in a similar military way in recent Syrian 
history could broaden the perspective on this water use. The 1982 Hama revolt and the regime’s 
response to that could in this respect form an interesting case. Zooming in to this particular Syrian 
history also provides some additional insights in the complicated political relations and security 
threats under the rule of Hafez al-Assad. 
The eyewitness account of the British journalist Robert Fisk is one of the very few foreign 
accounts on the revolt. The absence of Hama 1982 in academic literature is remarkable, as some 
journalists have noted.88 The Tunisian political scientist Larki Sadiki has argued that Hama was 
“murdered” twice; first by the troops of Hafez al-Assad (and his brother Rifaat), and then a second 
time, by ‘erasure from the nation’s emotions, memory, history books, newspapers, photography, 
and typography.’89 As the revolt was cracked down in three weeks in February 1982, journalists 
were banned from entering the city. Only since the outbreak of the current revolution have 
accounts of the events found their way to (international) media.90 
Hama was traditionally a conservative stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. It had 
already seen rioting and fighting in 1964, when the Brotherhood rebelled against the Ba’th’s 
National Guard, and the army was used to put down the insurgence, killing approximately seventy 
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Muslim brothers.91 Throughout 1980-1981 the Brotherhood conducted a series of bomb attacks 
and assassinations against government targets in diverse Syrian cities, and Hama was – alongside 
Aleppo – at the forefront of the rebellion. In retaliation for the killing of Ba’th party members, 
special regime forces and the mukhabarrat92 arrested and executed citizens of Hama who allegedly 
collaborated with the Muslim Brotherhood.93 In early February 1982, all-out revolt broke out. 
Government forces were ambushed, and hundreds of fighters overran government buildings and 
besieged the residence of Hama’s governor. During the three week battle, the regime cut all 
telephone and road communications with the city, forbidding foreign journalists to enter the city.94 
However, the British journalist Robert Fisk, writing for The Times, managed to enter Hama during 
the weeks of fighting for a very brief moment, and described the destruction of the city. The mostly 
female refugees he encountered were starved and all were in desperate need of drinking water. 
Because of the heavy fighting in the streets and the government’s blockades of the city, the citizens 
of Hama were left (in winter time) without food, water, and fuel.95  
The Jordanian journalist Suleiman al-Khalidi interviewed Syrian survivors of the massacre in 
Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gulf for a July 2011 article. The survivors argued that the tactics of the 
security forces against the 2011 demonstrations are comparable to the methods used by Hafez’ 
forces. Among them are the cutting of water supplies and electricity to the city.96 This mainly shows 
that the use of water as a weapon is nothing new in Syria nor in the wider region; it is a tried 
strategy. For example, another famous historic instance of the military use of water was the 
systematic draining of the Iraqi marshlands where the Marsh Arabs lived by Saddam Hussein in the 
late 1980s and 1990s – a move that some academics have labeled “ecocide”.97 This provides 
another example of the short-sightedness that is sometimes ingrained in histoire événementielle; 
comparable instances are overlooked in its insistence on uniqueness. Once again, an incentive for a 
different historical approach.    
 
2.3 Presidency of Bashar al-Assad 
 
With the death of Hafez in 2000 and the succession by his second son, Bashar al-Assad, some sort of 
thaw in the repression was expected. According to Hinnebusch, Bashar had generally positioned 
himself as a “modernizer”; open to information technology and economic modernization.98 In the 
so-termed “Damascus Spring”, civil society demanded a multiparty system and representative 
elections, as well as an end to emergency law.99 After a brief period of relative freedom, however, 
Bashar proved to be loyal to his father’s legacy and state repression remained central to the Syrian 
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power base. Scholars argued that Bashar inherited an authoritarian state with accompanying 
vulnerabilities. The president tried to “upgrade” the state’s characteristics, but failed to adapt 
corresponding political changes.100 
 
 Internal unrest 
 
Between 2000 and 2010 Syria faced a number of political and economic challenges. Economically, 
with his accession to power, Bashar al-Assad further abandoned Ba’thist socialist-focused ideology 
and initiated reform efforts in the administrative and private and public sector. In 2005 the 
president announced the adoption of the Social Market Economy at the tenth Ba’th Regional 
Command Conference. Through this ‘[…] odd combination of central planning and market forces’101, 
the development of market institutions and mechanisms was for the first time in Ba’thist Syria 
officially legitimated. The reform program – by some scholars classified as deeply neoliberal102 – 
consisted of policies of privatization, Syria’s opening up to foreign direct investment, and the 
removal of state control in some industrial sectors. Syria became part of the Greater Arab Free 
Trade Agreement (GAFTA), which opened up new markets for Syria’s export.103 New investment 
laws were passed from 2005 onwards.  
Nevertheless, Haddad argues in a 2011 article that most Syrians have not been able to benefit 
from these macroeconomic changes because ‘[…] there is not a firm political will to launch a new 
social contract and […] more comprehensive institutional reform.’104 While Syria appeared 
relatively unharmed following the 2008 global economic crisis, sustainable economic growth, 
needed for social and political stability, was lacking. Social development failed to take place, 
threatening social stability.105 Furthermore, on a political level the Assad regime did not succeed in 
broadening its power base by connecting to the secular nationalist opposition. In 2003, when the 
United States invaded Iraq, the opposition supported Assad’s opposition to the invasion, but no 
further rapprochement took place. In 2005 Syria was forced to withdraw from Lebanon, where it 
had dominated political and economic life for 29 years.106 As a result of this, the secular opposition 
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published in October 2005 the Damascus Declaration, calling among others for pluralism and rule 
of law and rejecting totalitarianism. However, as Hinnebusch argues, the Syrian public, wary of 
external threats, continued to support Assad, who launched several waves of repression in 2006 
and 2008, and was re-elected in 2007.107 
With regard to Syria’s domestic affairs these years, Haddad names unemployment, a “social 
gap” between rural and urban areas, and a looming water crisis as the most important challenges or 
threats to social, political, and economic stability.108 In the mid-2000s there was a projected 
exhaustion of Syria’s oil reserves, which resulted in cutting subsidies on fuel. This affected a wide 
range of Syrians ‘[…] from farmers using irrigation pumps to taxi drivers and those who found 
heating oil priced beyond their means.’109 Privatization resulted in degradation of the public sector. 
Agriculture declined because of the removal of subsidies, the neglect of agricultural planning and 
cooperatives, and the severe 2006-2010 drought. The cities saw an influx of not only migrating 
farmers, but also Iraqi refugees. In the real-estate sector, rent-control was abandoned and Gulf 
capital invested, resulting in a housing crisis.110 Such was the situation on the eve of the Arab 
Spring.   
 
 The Syrian revolution 
 
In March 2011, following uprisings in other countries, the Arab Spring reached Syria when protests 
in the province of Dar’a broke out. The protesters demanded an end to the Emergency Law, the 
legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt officials.111 As the protests spread to 
other cities in Syria, the Syrian regime reacted with repression and force as Assad clung to power. 
The past years, Syria has floated into complete chaos, with innumerable factions with different 
backgrounds and interests fighting their own proxy wars as well as one another. The (then) United 
Nations high commissioner for human rights Navi Pillay estimated the death toll to be over 191.000 
by late August 2014. Use of chemical weapons, sectarian strife, genocide and crimes against the 
humanity have been committed. More than three million Syrians have sought refuge in other 
countries – most importantly placing Syria’s direct neighbors Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan under 
heavy strain.  An additional 6.5 million are reported to be internally displaced, accounting in total 
for almost half of the population.112 Politically, the international community – the regional players, 
United Nations, EU, United States, Russia, China and more – has not been able to agree on 
appropriate measures. The UN has appointed several special representatives, sometimes with a 
joint mandate from the Arab League, but the representatives nor conferences like Geneva I and II 
have generated the needed results. In the meantime, Assad was re-elected on June 3, 2014, 
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receiving 88.7 percent of the votes in presidential elections that were disregarded by the 
international community as a “parody of democracy”.113   
This geographical and historical background is important to take into account when 
examining political water management by the Syrian state. Geographical features determine to a 
certain extent the need for water management at the international level – transboundary rivers and 
basins automatically push towards interactions between countries over water. But Syria’s Ba’thist 
domestic policies also directly underlie water management at the international and national level. 
With these geographical, historical, and political backgrounds in mind, we first move to 
international water management and the question of water as a tool for diplomacy. 
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Chapter 3.Water as a tool for diplomacy – international water management 
 
Water management by the Syrian government has been conducted at several levels. In the 
international political arena treaties exist between Syria and Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan on 
shared water resources in the region. On the national, regional, and the towns and village levels 
water policies have been implemented and projects have been carried out. I will here focus on the 
international level – by which I mean intra-state interactions between Syria and its neighboring 
countries – and argue that international water management can render water a tool for diplomacy 
through the use of certain instruments. Diplomacy or hydro-diplomacy, a term that is used to 
specifically indicate cooperation over water114, is consequently regarded here as an aim of political 
international water management, that can be reached via diverse canals. 
The Syrian part of the Euphrates-Tigris River basin will be central in this chapter. As fits the 
general paradigm of water as a tool for conflict and cooperation, both difficulties and collaboration 
have marked relations between the riparian countries over the Euphrates-Tigris River basin.115 The 
negotiations over the basin are exemplary of international, inter-state negotiations conducted at a 
high-policy level; the level that most scholarly and analytical literature has focused on. From this 
body of literature, some interesting findings on international water negotiations and hydro-
diplomacy can be derived. 
 
3.1 International negotiations literature 
 
A 2013 report on hydro-diplomacy opened with the argument that the management of 
transboundary waters like the Euphrates is ‘[…] eclipsed by politics and complicated by power 
asymmetry.’116 This reflects the highly politicized nature of water management. More often, 
however, negotiations literature has been written from within the ecological discourse, focusing on 
scarcity and consequent risks or possibilities. As already mentioned in the introduction to the 
literature, within this ecological discourse there are some interesting differences between the older 
1970s-1990s literature and more recent writing from the end of the 1990s onwards. There has 
come to be more regard for positions within the MENA region itself. For example, the UN-Economic 
and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) signals that climate change has become a 
prominent argument in the region in debates on sustainability in the past decade.117 Moreover, the 
emphasis is increasingly placed on the cooperative potential of water, rather than its potential for 
conflict. In a more recent (2013) article than the ones outlined in the introduction to the literature 
(early 1990s), Pacific Institute director Peter Gleick has also somewhat backed out of the idea of 
actual great water wars. According to him, the media rather than academia propagates this image. 
Indeed, yet in 2013 the infamous CNN journalist Fareed Zakaria posed ‘[…] will ME upheavals in 
future be directed by water instead of oil? We often talk of a world of nuclear haves and have-nots, 
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but a world of water haves and have-nots could be even more dangerous. Water is the resource we 
need to worry most about.’118 
Despite these shifts, then, the perceived increased risks of water-related violence – due to 
increasing scarcity – that may turn into international conflicts continue to be emphasized. Gleick 
argues that international mechanisms have not succeeded in reducing these risks.119 Here I disagree 
with Gleick. As I will show with regard to Syria, international negotiations have resulted in political 
advantages and risk reduction for the riparian countries. In practice, the international sharing of 
water resources has allowed governments to politicize water resources for strategic international 
diplomacy. This political dimension should not be overruled by the scarcity discourse. Negotiations 
and hydro-diplomacy literature have understandably focused on basins or water flows rather than 
specific countries.120 Here, however, I will focus specifically on Syria and its international water 
management vis-à-vis the other riparians.    
 
3.2 Syria’s international water management: the Euphrates-Tigris River basin 
 
The Euphrates-Tigris River basin has been the focal point of international negotiations between the 
riparians – Turkey, Syria, and Iraq – since the 1960s onwards. It has even been argued that the 
Euphrates and Tigris waters lie at the core of the political and strategic interactions that have taken 
place between Syria and Turkey in the past half-century.121 Hydro-political tensions have 
characterized the interactions, but no actual military conflict has arisen.  
The Euphrates originates in the eastern mountains of Turkey, flows through Syria, and joins 
the Tigris flow in Iraq, where the rivers form the Shatt al-Arab, which discharges in the Persian Gulf. 
The Tigris originates in the same mountains, flows along a brief stretch of the Syrian-Turkish 
border, and then enters Iraq. The rivers cross several climatic conditions, from a Mediterranean 
climate in Turkey to highly arid zones in Iraq. The estimated population in the Euphrates basin is 
23 million, in the Tigris basin 23.4 million. Regarding the Euphrates population, 25 percent or 
almost six million people live in Syria. For the Tigris basin, this is only fifty thousand people. Syria is 
very much dependent on the Euphrates, as more than fifty percent of the used water in the country 
is abstracted from the river. Both Euphrates and Tigris River flows show negative trends and heavy 
deviations regarding mean annual flow, and water quantity and quality are a source for concern in 
the entire basin. Both rivers have been impacted by large infrastructures. Also, historical joint 
agreements have addressed both rivers.122  
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Figure 3. The Euphrates-Tigris River basin, Encyclopaedia Britannica 
 
 
 
 
From the 1960s onwards, intertwined with state-building, all riparian countries started to develop 
plans to exploit the rivers. Syria alone constructed three very large dams (Tabqa, Ba’th, Tishreen), 
created its largest water reservoir Lake Assad (1970s), and initiated the Great Khabour Irrigation 
Project (2000s).123 The Turkish political scientist Aysegul Kibaroglu divides water politics in the 
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basin in four periods. While the 1920-1960 period was characterized by harmonious 
transboundary water relations, the consolidation of the riparian states between 1960-1980 brought 
increased competition and disagreements. Negotiations were mainly conducted by riparian 
technocrats. Between 1980 and the late 1990s, however, transboundary water issues became the 
stake of high politics. In 1980 the Joint Technical Committee was established between Turkey and 
Iraq, and Syria joined in 1983. Between 1983 and 1993 sixteen meetings were held. Yet, as 
Kibaroglu argues, ‘a series of diplomatic crises over the development and usage of transboundary 
water erupted.’124 In the fourth phase, from the late 1990s onwards, water issues were again 
relegated to the technical level and handled by intergovernmental networks, while a lack of mutual 
trust and confidence amongst the riparians remained in place.125  
Kibaroglu’s diplomatic crises fall within a negotiation cycle outlined by political scientist 
Marwa Daoudy. She argues that the negotiation process is characterized by both ‘peaks of conflict 
and periods of mutual cooperation’126. Power is key to the negotiations. Interestingly, Daoudy 
distinguishes between structural power and bargaining power in the negotiation process. In the 
international arena, power asymmetry is a fundamental aspect of hydro-diplomacy and riparian 
negotiations. In the Euphrates-Tigris River basin, Turkey as the upstream riparian holds the keys to 
water allocation, benefitting from its geographical position. Bargaining power, however, provides 
the downstream riparians some leverage and narrows the power gap.127 Syria has in this regard 
used “issue-linkage”, which occurs when ‘[…] an upstream-downstream issue is linked to another 
issue and cooperation is generated by mutual concessions.’128  
Turkey’s Great Anatolian Project (GAP) provides an interesting example for studying Syria’s 
international water management. Since 1980 upstream riparian Turkey has been working on the 
GAP, that is to result in irrigating twenty percent of the country’s total irrigable area and producing 
22 percent of its total hydro-electric potential. To achieve this, 22 dams and nineteen hydro-electric 
power plants are built on the Euphrates and Tigris.129 It is estimated that the impact on the 
downstream countries will ultimately – the GAP is scheduled to be completed in 2047 – be quite 
significant. Although the exact plans have been revised repeatedly, both quantitative and qualitative 
water supply to Syria comes under pressure because of the GAP.130 Most of the water conflicts and 
cooperation between Syria and Turkey are connected to Turkey’s GAP. Four occurrences are most 
significant. In 1987, within the framework of the Protocol of Economic Cooperation, Turkey agreed 
to a minimum yearly average flow to Syria. Then, early 1990 Turkey drastically reduced the 
Euphrates flow to fill its Atatürk Dam, and a conflict loomed. In protesting the situation, Syria 
strategically joined forces with Iraq. In 2001 a Joint Communiqué was issued, under which the 
Syrian Ministry of Irrigation and the Turkish Regional Development Administration of the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project agreed to joint research and projects. The past ten years, UN-ESCWA 
research suggests that political relations between Turkey and Syria have improved. Bilateral visits, 
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a free trade agreement, and the Syrian-Turkish Strategic Cooperation Council Agreement (2009) – 
which stated that water is a focal point for cooperation and emphasized improvements to water 
quality and the development of joint water policies – provide opportunities for increased 
cooperation.131  
Between Syria and Iraq, the negotiations history follows a roughly similar path. A hydro-
political crisis erupted in 1974 when Iraq accused Syria of withdrawing too much water following a 
severe drought. Resumed precipitation, together with combined Soviet and Saudi mediation 
resulted in oral agreements between the countries. In 1990 Syria and Iraq reached a bilateral 
agreement on the water allocation of the Euphrates on a 42-58 percent ratio. Furthermore in 2009, 
following the regime change in Iraq, the countries signed 48 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). 
In the MoU on water, they agreed to share and exchange hydrological and meteorological data and 
expertise.132 
As can be seen when analyzing Syria’s hydro-diplomacy, Syria has strategically managed its 
transboundary water resources at the international level in various ways, particularly vis-à-vis the 
hegemon in the basin, Turkey. It has on occasion allied with Iraq against Turkey to enhance its 
bargaining power. Also, throughout the negotiations, issue-linkage has been a vital strategy of 
Syrian international water management. Most importantly within this issue linkage, Syria has used 
the Kurdish issue as a collateral subject by rendering support to the PKK between 1984-1998.133 
Although this triggered several peaks of conflict – most notably in 1998 before Syria backed down 
from supporting the PKK – Daoudy argues that the subsequent need for collaboration with Syria on 
security issues was on the Turkish part the main driver to conclude the 1987 agreement on a 
minimum water allocation.134 Additionally, Syria has tried to exert financial pressures on Turkey by 
appealing to European agencies and the World Bank to block investments in the GAP.135  
Power asymmetries in the Euphrates-Tigris basin seem to have guided upstream-
downstream interactions towards bilateral arrangements.136 No basin-wide agreements are in 
place, rendering the current agreements more preoccupied with the short run and less stable. 
Additionally, the riparians disagree on international water laws, and external mediation like the 
combined Soviet and Saudi one between Syria and Iraq in 1974 has not necessarily lead to 
sustainable arrangements.137 Nevertheless, this analysis of Syria’s international water management 
in the Euphrates-Tigris basin does confirm the prevalence of cooperation over conflict. It shows 
how international water management can become highly politicized through issue-linkage and how 
water can thus become a tool to work towards diplomacy.  
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3.3 Politicizing Syria’s international water management 
Syria’s water management in the Euphrates-Tigris River basin vis-à-vis upstream Turkey and 
downstream Iraq shows that conflict over water is not shunned but has not resulted in actual wars. 
Moreover, it indicates the difficulties and dependencies in cooperation within asymmetric power 
relations. And finally, it shows connections between the field of politics and the long-term 
geographical history, as I will briefly explain. 
Syria’s hydro-diplomacy has in the first place been determined by geographical features; the 
need for interaction over a shared water resource. Thus, structural geographical history – the 
relation between in this case a country and its environment – dictates the stage on which the play is 
set. But afterwards, human agency takes over. Looking at Syria’s hydro-diplomacy in the Euphrates-
Tigris basin, it is characterized by what I would label “pragmatic strategies”. These pragmatic 
strategies are visible in Syria’s alliance with Iraq against Turkey and in its use of issue-linkage. By 
linking water management, in which Turkey has a given advantageous position, to the Kurdish 
question, the Syrian state provided itself with leverage. Equally, Syria’s appeal to international 
institutions can be seen as a pragmatic move rather than a constructive effort. The strategies seem 
not to be necessarily aimed at establishing long-term, lasting agreements or cooperation. Rather, 
they are – to some extent – ad-hoc reactions to actions by Turkey that may disadvantage Syria. 
Turkey is put under pressure, which eventually results in diplomatic dialogue or agreements. It has 
not, however, resulted in sustainable basin-wide agreements between the three riparians.   
Water management at the international level is intertwined with power asymmetry. 
Consequently, it can be considered to relate to the political discourse with its (Marxist) 
distributionist view of the uneven allocation of resources. By emphasizing this discrepancy in 
(resource) wealth through its pragmatic strategies but also through its appeals to global 
institutions like the World Bank, the Syrian government politicizes international water 
management through the lens of the political distributionist discourse. 
The development of Syria’s hydro-diplomacy can roughly be related to the timeline of Ba’th 
domestic policies. From the 1960s onwards Hafez al-Assad and the Ba’th Party engaged in a process 
of state-building which included the development of water infrastructures and other forms of water 
management.138 In these years, as Kibaroglu pointed out, the first tensions between the riparians 
appeared.139 Hydro-diplomacy was mostly exerted via technocrats and technical meetings. After the 
consolidation of Assad’s power, it seems that Syria emboldened its international water 
management in the 1980s and 1990s, bringing it more into the realm of international politics by the 
above-mentioned pressuring pragmatic strategies. Hafez’ succession by Bashar was followed by 
some economic relaxation in Syria. Equally, relaxation in riparian relations and increasing 
cooperation between both Syria and Turkey and Syria and Iraq can be observed in the examination 
of the Euphrates-Tigris basin. 
Since the Syrian crisis started in 2011, relations between Syria and Turkey have seriously 
deteriorated. Turkey has issued sanctions against Syria, but these have not touched upon its water 
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supply to Syria in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. The UN-ESCWA report mentions that the Syrian 
Ministry of Irrigation has reaffirmed that water agreements between the riparians have not been 
affected by the conflict. Nevertheless, they also report that continued meetings and negotiations 
seem to have come to a halt.140 With the current levels of destruction and despair the country faces, 
it seems unlikely that Syria’s hydro-diplomacy will soon be resumed let alone advanced.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
Annika Kramer, a German environmental engineer, argued in her 2008 case study on regional 
water cooperation in the Middle East that water is often a starting point for dialogue, but that actual 
cooperation in water resources management remains difficult.141 The examination of Syrian 
international water management, with a focus on its hydro-diplomacy in the Euphrates-Tigris basin 
confirms this argument. Tools such as issue linkage and strategic cooperation constituted 
pragmatic strategies. Employing these pragmatic strategies allowed the Syrian state to push for 
hydro-diplomacy within its international water management. Geographically-based power 
asymmetries were consequently (partly) neutralized, although they were at the same time 
accentuated through the Syrian government’s emphasis on the maldistribution of resources. This 
resulted in Syrian agreements with Turkey and Iraq, but sustainable settlements and cooperation to 
guarantee continuing stability in the basin are not yet in place. Nevertheless, it can be concluded 
that shared water resources lead to diplomacy rather than big conflicts or war – smaller 
disagreements between the riparians left aside. The analysis shows how Syrian water management, 
in this case at the international level, must also be regarded in its connection to security; 
hydrological power asymmetry comes hand in hand with certain vulnerabilities and risks. 
In this chapter, Syria has been presented as one abstract entity, as is the case in most of the 
mentioned negotiations literature. Much of the research on water and water management has 
focused on this abstract, international level. My arguments on water as a tool for diplomacy are 
based on a solid body of secondary literature. But as some scholars have argued, an examination of 
the national or local level may generate a completely different view and outlook.142 On the national 
and local level research on water management has been conducted differently and less extensively. 
Trumbull argued that people view water first as a domestic issue, close to home, and only secondly 
as a global problem mediated through the state.143 Zooming in from Syria as an abstract entity to 
the situation on the ground will provide insights in this smaller-scale, every day water 
management. In this third chapter, I argued that Syrian hydro-diplomacy evolved roughly alongside 
Ba’th domestic policies. In the next chapter, I will shift the focus to the smaller, national scale that is 
the focus context of this thesis, and closer examine the dynamics of national policymaking and its 
impact on water management. I will argue that water management at the national level has mostly 
been aimed at using water as a tool for development.  
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Chapter 4. Water as a tool for development – national water management  
 
In October 2010, an article appeared in the New York Times, bearing the ominous title “In Mideast, 
a Drought of Biblical Proportions”.144 Its author reported from Ar-Raqqah in Syria on the drought 
that had struck parts of Syria and Iraq around the Euphrates River, causing the abandonment of 
hundreds of villages and the growth of refugee camps sheltering dispossessed farmers and their 
families throughout the region. Experts estimated that Syria’s total water resources had diminished 
with fifty percent between 2002 and 2008. Additionally, the United Nations special rapporteur on 
the right to food, Olivier de Schutter, reported that the drought, which started in 2006, pushed two 
to three million Syrians into extreme poverty. Among the alleged causes of the drought, corruption 
and failed administration were mentioned.145 In this chapter, I will further explore the Syrian water 
management at the national level – the level of the Syrian central government – with some links to 
the local level – the level of towns and villages. Hereto, I will examine the question how political 
water use can render water a tool for development. Development is in this regard closely linked to 
modernization; two important pillars in Ba’th state-building and domestic policies, as I will show. 
And how can water management be politicized at the national level? This is a second part of the 
larger argument of water as a tool for both cooperation and conflict, and can again be related to the 
Syrian state’s security prism, as I will show.  
 
4.1 Research on national water management 
A different body of literature has focused on this smaller scale level of water management. The 
works of Francesca De Châtel, a journalist and editor specializing in water issues in the Arab world 
and the Mediterranean, are characteristic for this stream. De Châtel has conducted extensive 
research into the issue of water in Syria and water management by the Syrian regime, and has 
written many highly useful articles and books on the subject. She lived in Damascus from 2006-
2010 and bases her research on her on-the-ground experiences, thus providing a valuable insight in 
the period just before the Syrian uprising. In her works, she advocates that mismanagement of 
water resources by the Syrian government, with its accompanying consequences, has been an 
important cause of the current conflict.  
In one of her articles, De Châtel describes the fate of Wadi Barada (the Barada valley), the 
Barada River, and the village Kufayr al-Zayt, situated in the west of greater Damascus.146 The 
Barada River formed the main source of water for Damascus and the Ghouta plain. From the 1960s 
onwards, there was an enormous population growth in Damascus and its suburbs – from 700.000 
people in 1950 to approximately seven million in 2011. This resulted in drinking water shortages, 
which the government tried to compensate through pipelines and boreholes and a new distribution 
system. Soon after these constructions, the Barada River ran dry from May until December. The 
supply of drinking water became unreliable, there was no water available for agricultural irrigation, 
and the tourist industry in the valley ran dry while unemployment ran high. Villagers encountered 
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unresponsiveness and some suppression from the government when they voiced their complaints 
in the 2000s. Meanwhile, new Damascene suburbs situated closely to Wadi Barada enjoyed a 
constant supply of good quality water drawn from groundwater reserves in a different area.147 
When protests in Kufayr al-Zayt occurred in April 2011, following the larger uprising in 
Syria, restoration of the river and permanent access to clean drinking water were the first demands 
to the government, rather than the fall of the regime. When the regime did not respond to the 
demands, local militias were set up, and the Syrian army eventually moved in to crush the 
resistance. After this, with its location in the vicinity of Damascus, the Barada valley has not seen 
much fighting since 2012 and has remained (nominally) under government control. As the revolt 
sank into civil war, an enormous influx of internally displaced civilians from war zones has resulted 
in a more than doubling of the population in Wadi Barada. The already problematic water supply 
has thus come under even more severe pressure, alongside food and electricity supplies.148  
Research like this, carried out on a small, local scale provides insights in the larger problems 
here at stake. It shows how at the smaller level local grievances were linked to the larger Syrian 
uprising. De Châtel does not stand alone in her argument about the link between water scarcity and 
water management and the current crisis. From 2013 onwards, hydrologists and political experts 
alike have noted (possible) connections between the severe drought of 2006-2011 that generated 
mass migration to urban centers, and the uprisings that – as they argue – were sparked by angry, 
unemployed men in the cities. While this line of argument seems perfectly valid, it often lacks an 
empirical base. Unlike De Châtel, who conducted extensive research on the ground, most of these 
claims are made by media or political scientists who deduct their ideas from secondary 
literature.149 This does not render their arguments invalid, but their argumentation has a limited 
focus on crisis situations, without an outlook on the broader backgrounds of water management. 
Reports that focus on security, risks, and vulnerability of Syria’s natural resources, appearing both 
before and during the conflict, stress the perils of increased drought ‘due to a combination of man-
made and natural factors.’150 Moreover, they all urgently recommend the addressing of the total 
array of Syria’s societal, environmental, and climatic problems.151 This is highly important. Focusing 
just on the current situation obscures political and societal backgrounds. The works of De Châtel 
thus form the starting point from which to move into a deeper analysis. A more integrative and 
systematic approach to the discussion of water (mis)management by the Assad regime, its 
historical connection to development, and its relation to Syrian politics is needed.  
 
4.2 Hydraulic mission: water management and development 
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Water can also become politicized through development policies. National water management by 
the Syrian state since the advent of the Ba’th Party will be examined. In the quest for state-building 
and modernization, agricultural – thus, water related – policies fulfilled a key role. These ushered 
the Syrian government into what has been termed the hydraulic mission to lift the Syrian 
population from poverty via the modernization of agriculture. The development of the electricity 
sector was also closely connected to this.152  
In the 1950s Syria was a predominantly agricultural country, with two million peasants out 
of a then population of 3.5 million.153 The British historian and journalist Patrick Seale describes the 
‘degraded peasantry’ as Syria’s ‘most fundamental problem’154; highly dependent on their 
landowners and uncertain rainfall, especially on the plain around Hama. Farmlands were often 
neglected and no investments in durability were made, while the city of Hama lived ‘parasitically’ 
on the surplus of the lands.155  
Socioeconomic improvements predated Hafez al-Assad’s rule, but took a flight with Assad in 
power in the late 1960s and 1970s. Infrastructural projects like the building of roads, railways, 
dams, and bridges were initiated, and the life of the peasantry was to be improved by investments 
in agriculture, the main focus of the Ba’th Party. The American geographer and anthropologist 
Jessica Barnes as well as De Châtel have traced Ba’th’s agricultural and water policies since its 
ascent to power in 1963.156 Barnes emphasizes the party’s member’s rural origins and subsequent 
strong ties with the rural sector, arguing that ‘Al-Assad, the first ruler in Syria’s history of peasant 
origin, cemented the state-rural relationship.’157 The importance of the agricultural sector is 
reflected in figure 4, which shows that it accounts for 87 percent of water withdrawal. The 
hydraulic mission to develop Syria was most significantly exerted by the establishment of centrally 
managed irrigation schemes with dams, and support for the development of groundwater 
resources. Another key agricultural policy objective was a central planning strategy for agriculture 
with subsidization of strategic (water intensive) crops like wheat and cotton. This was meant to 
result in self-sufficiency in the main food staples. Figure 5 illustrates the quantity of used land per 
crop. Figures estimate that between 1960 and 2000 twenty billion dollar, or twenty percent of the 
country’s total investment resources, was spent on agricultural projects.158  
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 Figure 4. Aquastat: Water 
withdrawal by sector (2003) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Aquastat: Quantity of land 
and irrigated crops (2000) 
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Irrigation infrastructure expanded in a high pace from 1963 onwards. Between 1963 and 2001 
around 160 dams were constructed, with 28 new dams scheduled within the Ninth Five Year Plan 
2001-2005. New projects were planned and launched right until the start of the revolution: in 
March 2011 several new hydropower dams were being planned and built on the Euphrates and 
Orontes Rivers, and a 2.1 billion dollar Tigris River program was launched.159 The building of dams, 
in particular in the case of the Euphrates Basin Project of 1968, is regarded among scholars as a 
“showcase of Ba’thist development policies”.160 By bringing electricity to villages and by boosting 
agricultural production and local industries, the regime aimed not only at social change and 
modernization, but also at establishing political control over unruly regions. Using water as a tool 
for development, than, should strengthen centralization efforts and should provide the state with a 
sense of authority and respect.161 This again relates to the Syrian government’s political security 
prism: strengthening the political power of the regime.  
With these top-down measures to modernize Syria, however, came increased stress on 
water resources. The Tabqa Dam project in the Euphrates basin did not succeed in creating 640.000 
hectares of additional fertile land – as was hoped for and planned – but rather brought to light the 
problem of rapid salinization due to a lack of proper irrigation and drainage. The establishment of 
industries led to pollution of ground water. A cement factory built near Tartus caused the 
destruction of thousands of olive trees among a valuable stretch of the Mediterranean coastline.162 
Following Syria’s economic boom in the 1970s, money was pumped into the agricultural and 
electricity sector, however, Haddad critically poses that investment chaos arose, whereby ‘[…] 
experts from Bulgaria and Romania, in addition to local experts, would prepare feasibility studies in 
a hasty manner, not considering all the practical aspects of the projects.’163 This resulted in 
improper locations or improper soil for agricultural projects and no consideration of the 
environment. Moreover, a severe drought in the 1980s indicated Syria’s ongoing heavy dependence 
on rainfall. The country had to import costly food, experienced severe power cuts due to a fall in the 
Euphrates flow, and thirty percent of the sheep had to be slaughtered because of a lack of grazing 
grounds in the last decade(s) of the twentieth century.164 When the state pushed forward its 
liberalization agenda and reversed its agricultural reform policies from the 1970s, large private 
farms emerged, that appropriated much of the underground water.165 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) runs a highly useful global 
water information system, Aquastat. A 2008 report on Syria offers an insight in state water 
management before the current crisis, and provides some alarming figures. In 2003, the total 
annual water withdrawal was estimated at 16.69 km3/year, which is an increase of 31 percent 
compared to the total annual water withdrawal of 1993. Between 1995 and 2005 the annual per 
capita water availability decreased from 1.791 m3 to 882 m3 – below the water scarcity line of 
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1000m3 per person every year. Syria usually has around 15.6 billion m3 water per year at its 
disposal, but with its steady increase in water use has built up an annual deficit of 3.5 billion m3. 
The deficit is mostly solved by heavily tapping into groundwater reserves; by 1997 five of the seven 
water basins had a negative water balance. 60.1 percent of irrigation water comes from 
groundwater. In 2000 28.5 percent of agricultural crop areas were dependent on irrigation, with 
crops such as sugar beet and cotton and the citrus area being entirely irrigated.166 The availability 
of groundwater is thus vital for the Syrian economy, but has in the past years come under extreme 
pressure. 
For a closer examination of the developmental use of water and its accompanying 
consequences, we turn again to the basin scale. Whereas the Euphrates-Tigris basin was central in 
the previous chapter, water management in the Orontes River basin will be the focus here. Although 
this basin is also shared by three riparian countries and bilateral and international agreements are 
in place, it makes an interesting case study at a different geographical and geopolitical level. 
Employing a national scale and conducting a brief case study of cooperation in the Orontes basin 
allows for a switch to inductive research.   
 
4.3 Syria’s national water management – the Orontes River basin 
 
The Orontes River starts from springs in Lebanon, flows south-north through Syria, thereby passing 
the cities of Homs, Hama, and Idleb, and debouches into the Mediterranean Sea via Turkish soil. In 
2010 it was estimated that the basin had a population of approximately 5.7 million, of which 4.2 
million Syrians.167 According to a 2014 Swiss research of the basin, the combined surface water and 
groundwater supplies accounted for a quarter of the agricultural production and a third of the 
industrial production in Syria prior to the conflict.168 Water infrastructures dating back as far as the 
Bronze Age bear witness to the river’s historical significance in Syria. Hama is renowned for its 
norias, large wooden waterwheels that raised water to aqueducts that were used for irrigation and 
drinking water supply. They are claimed to date back to 1100 BC and some have survived 
throughout the ages.169  
The Orontes basin became one of the first industrialized regions in Syria from the late 
1940s onwards and formed the first focus for the Ba’th Party’s agricultural projects. Farmers who 
cultivated irrigated lands in the Orontes basin benefited from the agricultural reforms and policies 
of the Party, until in the second half of the 1970s the Euphrates became the priority of the 
government.170 Irrigation for agricultural products expanded rapidly over the past thirty years.  The 
basin was one of the prime tree production regions in Syria and accounted for a large part of the 
livestock production. Prior to the current conflict, 95 percent of urban and 89 percent of rural 
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households in the basin were connected to the public water supply system, with the Ministry of 
Water Resources claiming in 2010 that the availability of drinking water per capita in most rural 
areas ranged from fifty to 75 liters per day. According to the latest figures – dating, however, from 
1999 – the Orontes basin accounted for twenty percent of Syria’s water withdrawal (with the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin accounting for fifty percent). Therefore, water management of the basin is 
or should be of vital interest.171  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Map of Syria (2001) with the Orontes River flowing from Lebanon through western Syria, 
bypassing among others the cities of Homs, Hama, and Idleb, Arab Culture and Civilization. 
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Figure 7. SDWC (2008): Orontes River Basin with the positions of Hama and Homs specifically 
highlighted. 
  
45 
 
All three riparian countries (Lebanon, Syria, Turkey) have intensively used the river for 
agricultural purposes and additional irrigation projects have put pressure on the resources. 
Comparable to the Euphrates-Tigris basin there are no basin-wide agreements between the three 
riparians in place, but bilateral arrangements on water allocation and water infrastructures do 
exist. Syria and Lebanon have for several years cooperated in the Lebanese-Syrian Joint Committee 
for Shared Water. In 1994, Syria and Lebanon signed the Agreement on the Distribution of Orontes 
River Water Originating in Lebanese Territory, under which Lebanon received a certain amount of 
water, with the figure being adjusted downwards relative to the reduction in flow. Also, the 
countries agreed that already operational wells were allowed to remain in use, but new wells were 
not permitted.172 Since 2009, a Memorandum of Understanding exists between Syria and Turkey, 
concerning the construction of the joint Orontes River Friendship Dam. The MoU was linked to the 
establishment of the Syrian-Turkish Strategic Cooperation Council in the same year, mentioned in 
the previous chapter. However, experts have generally indicated that cooperation between Syria 
and Turkey has been more strained because of ‘the status of their relations in general, and 
discussions over the sharing of the Euphrates River in particular.’173  
Regarding the Orontes basin, Syria has been criticized by international organizations on the 
intensification and long-term sustainability of its water use.174 Groundwater abstraction is the most 
important component of Syrian water management in the Orontes basin. Since the 1960s, following 
the use of diesel-motor pumps, extraction rates have soared while the groundwater table has 
rapidly dropped. While previous small extractions for drinking water were naturally replenished, 
fundamental changes took place from the 1960s onwards. Figures from the National Agricultural 
Policy Centre (NAPC) estimate that lands irrigated by groundwater more than doubled between 
1985 and 2005, whereas the number of wells increased between 1999 and 2007 from 135.089 to 
213.335.175 According to a NAPC 2010 report, the Orontes basin has an annual water deficiency of 
1.2 billion m3.176 Water experts (both foreign and local) have been warning about the sustainability 
of the increased groundwater use for several years. A Dutch hydro-geologist argues that due to the 
advent of electricity in the 1970s and the explosion of wells in the 1980s withdrawal rates in the 
Orontes basin in the 1980s and 1990s were five times higher each decade than the previous decade, 
leading in some areas to a drop in the groundwater table from fifty to hundred meters between the 
1950s and 2000.177  
Another problematic component linked to water management in the Orontes basin is water 
pollution. Aquastat reports that surface and groundwater are polluted by industrial and municipal 
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waste in all areas near larger settlements. In the period 1995-2000 some waterborne diseases such 
as typhoid and hepatitis increased tenfold, while diarrhea more than doubled as compared to the 
period 1991-1995. Aquastat suggests that this is due to scarcity of water resources, a lack of 
infrastructure to treat wastewater, a general lack of awareness regarding pollution, and the non-
existence or failure to adopt regulations to protect the environment and public health. This is a 
nation-wide phenomenon.178  
In this examination of the Orontes basin we see different issues than in the previous chapter 
where the Euphrates-Tigris basin was the focus. There, international water allocation was the 
dominant bottleneck, with water quantity and quality coming in second. In the Orontes basin, both 
water quantity and quality are identified as major issues. This indicates the earlier noticed 
discrepancy between the environmental field and (geo)politics. Studies that solely focus on 
international clashes or collaboration largely bypass smaller-scale practical and ecological water 
issues of quantity and quality. In a similar vein, if only the local or ecological scale is taken into 
account, larger water politics and implications are overlooked. 
 Perceptions of water management 
Following the reports and statistics on the Orontes basin and the state of the wider Syrian 
resources, an image arises of Syria as a country overly depending on unreliable rainfall, rapidly 
depleting its limited resources, with little feeling for long-term consequences. While water 
historically played an important role in Ba’th policies, in recent years the dominant attitude of the 
state to water seems to be one of neglect and indifference. This matches with the image that comes 
forward from the works of De Châtel. In an interview in 2010 with the Syrian minister of Irrigation, 
Nader al-Bunni, De Châtel asks about Syrian population growth and water availability in the future. 
After describing some of the measures the government has taken, he answers ‘I am confident we 
will reach 2035 in good shape. If you ask me about 2050, however, I would say that we should leave 
some work to our children.’179 
On a different note, other scholars stress the active role of the Syrian state in creating a 
narrative of helplessness vis-à-vis water scarcity and water management. Barnes argues that the 
Syrian government created scarcity through its specific agricultural policies and consequently 
presented water scarcity as being one of the country’s main developmental problems, resulting 
from geographical – natural – factors rather than mismanagement.180 Thus, geographical or natural 
facts and data seem to be turned into a political water narrative communicated by the government. 
Whereas in the previous chapter the government politicized international water management 
through an emphasis on the uneven distribution of water resources, at the national level a neo-
Malthusianist, ecological approach seems to prevail.  
Even though water scarcity and the overstretching of resources became increasingly 
apparent in the 1990s, the government has continued its expansion of agriculture and irrigation, 
also after the death of Hafez al-Assad. Semi-arid areas around the Euphrates and the Khabour River 
continued to be turned into land for intensive agriculture, resulting in pumping the water table dry. 
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Also, irrigation systems and soil conditions continued to deteriorate.181 A local journalist argued in 
2009 to the International Crisis Group that the 2006-2010 drought was a man-made disaster that 
was being ignored by the central government. While the government continued to blame it on 
climate change, the depletion of water supplies has increasingly become an irreversible process.182  
What perception of water problems did the Syrian government have? As has already been 
mentioned, the Syrian government at the international level propagated an image of asymmetric 
water distribution, and at the national level presented water scarcity as a result of population 
growth and climate change. The 2010 report of the government-affiliated National Agricultural 
Policy Center is a good example of this, breathing a political message through the ecological 
discourse. In its introduction it states that agriculture is considered ‘a major pillar of the sustainable 
development [of Syria]’.183 Whereas it characterizes Syria as a country with meager water resources 
due to increased water consumption and recent climatic changes, it emphasizes that the Syrian 
government tries its best to improve water management and water harvesting. Deficiencies in the 
water sector are largely caused by unorganized well-digging and water-pumping by the Syrian 
population and the absence of modern irrigation, which the government tries to counter. In 
accordance with its tenth Five Year Plan (2006-2011), the Syrian government implemented several 
policies to reduce water scarcity and maintain the sustainability of the available resources. The 
government issued a Water Law to organize the use of resources, modernized irrigation techniques, 
and banned the unorganized digging of wells as well as addressing the situation of illicit wells. To 
implement these policies, funds providing credits to peasants were set up. Also, cooperation with 
international experts was established.184 This is another example of a Syrian pragmatic strategy 
that can be used to advance its own agenda by diffusing an image of water scarcity. Hereto, I will 
conduct a brief case study of one of such international collaborations between the Syrian Ministry 
of Irrigation and several Dutch companies. 
 
4.4 Politicizing Syria’s national water management – a case study of the SDWC 
 Cooperation with international partners 
An important international collaboration was the Syrian-Dutch Water Cooperation (SDWC). The 
Netherlands has since 2002 been active in the Orontes basin, working together with the Syrian 
Ministry of Irrigation. The SDWC is interesting to examine here, because it was set up broadly, with 
a basin-wide focus and different project phases. It involved a range of Syrian ministries and local 
officials and ran for ten years. The (Dutch, Arabic, and English) reports of the SDWC as such provide 
new and unique insights into Syrian water politics and water management at the regional and local 
level, and they are useful as a new angle from which to analyze water management by the Syrian 
government and its surrounding narrative. They also form a test case for Barnes’ ideas concerning 
the political construction and spatial representations of scarcity. Moreover, from the Syrian side 
there has been written a booklet about the water problems in the Orontes basin and the 
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cooperation with the Dutch companies on that. Therefore, an analysis of the SDWC offers a practical 
view on how the Syrian state has used water as a tool for development.    
The SDWC has since 2002 strived to improve the water management of Syrian surface- and 
groundwater resources in the Orontes basin. The project aimed at developing and transmitting 
knowledge, as well as providing technical and institutional support. This happened via two tracks: 
the modelling of ground- and surface water, and the introduction of Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) with stakeholders. The direct counterpart of the Dutch in the SDWC was the 
General Commission for Water Resources, a part of the Ministry of Irrigation. The Water Resources 
Department of Homs functioned as the coordinating unit for the Orontes basin. The Syrian State 
Planning Commission, that is responsible for the Syrian Five Year Plans but also for the 
coordination, strategic planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the water sector and donor 
coordination was an important associated organization. Also, a range of ministries like the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MAAR), the Ministry of Housing and Construction (MHC), and 
the Ministry of Energy (MOE) was involved.185 
The SDWC project was divided into three phases. First, a groundwater model was 
established to contribute to the knowledge and awareness of the water situation. In the second 
phase, a surface water model was also developed. The third phase of the SDWC, planned from 2010-
2012 but as per 30 May 2011 temporarily postponed, furnished in the introduction of IWRM as a 
participative process to the stakeholders. IWRM was pioneered in three pilot areas, Mhardeh 
(Hama), Khan Shaykhun (Idleb), and Qusair (Homs).186  
The models brought to light the urgency regarding a freshwater deficit and indicated 
problems with both the quantity and the quality of the water in the basin.187 The most urgent issues 
identified were unsustainable groundwater abstraction (mining), unlicensed wells, inefficiencies 
and water loss in irrigation, deterioration of ecosystems, pollution of surface and groundwater 
resources, and limited awareness and knowledge amongst the Syrian population.188 The experts 
noticed that price guarantees and cheap diesel and electricity had allowed farmers to withdraw 
more freshwater than could be naturally replenished. Additionally, protectionist agricultural 
policies with few adaptions to changing circumstances or diversity in geohydrological conditions – 
as indeed De Châtel argued as well – have worsened the problems. They also notified the lack of 
efficient cooperation between the involved Syrian parties; while the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation 
served as the official counterpart, some responsibilities fell under the ministries of Agriculture, 
Environment, Housing, and Finance. The government wanted to work towards a national water 
strategy, thus centrally determining to a large degree what is happening at the local level. However, 
the Dutch experts argued that practical experience on the ground should serve to guide national 
policies. For example, a central Syrian government initiative was introducing a modern irrigation 
program that provided loans to farmers to switch to more efficient irrigation systems. But because 
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it was a national level program, it was applied in retrospective with too much rigidity at the local 
level, whereby farmers with illegal wells could not get a loan to switch their irrigation system.189  
The SDWC operated at two levels: the national and the governorate. At the national level, 
the cooperation aimed at strategic policy development and the creation of an enabling environment 
and required legislation for the local level. At the governorate level, the main aim was the 
application of IWRM in the pilot areas, whereby in each area issues were identified and solutions 
proposed. Through the implementation of IWRM, the development of a national and regional water 
policy should enforce mutual coordination and cooperation between the different parties and 
levels.190  
When the project was put on hold in May 2011, some important steps had been taken. The 
operational water management was to move from MoI to MAAR, who had requested SDWC 
assistance in advancing the development of a national water policy. A meeting between MoI and 
MAAR ministers on the continuation of the program beyond 2012 – the initial end-date of the 
cooperation – had taken place, and Syria was considering co-financing fifty percent of the program. 
These were considered positive developments. Moreover, the documents of the SDWC inform that 
the World Bank had taken an interest in the program and considered developing other projects in 
Syria. Other parties like the Swiss Development Cooperation were equally willing to invest in the 
water sector and were looking for possible cooperation.191 
 Critique on cooperation with international partners 
Critique on international cooperation and projects like the SDWC has been voiced in several ways. 
Most interestingly, Barnes argues that documents of international organizations are often produced 
in consultation with the concerned ministries, resulting in the framing of Syria’s resource problem 
as one of natural scarcity. By limiting this frame of reference to geography and nature, 
powerlessness and inequality are emphasized, rather than human agency – in this case the role of 
the Syrian government. She undertakes a quest to ‘“unmask” the social and political complexities 
underlying Syria’s natural resource problem’192. She concludes that population growth – often 
named as the most important cause for increased water demand – puts far less pressure on Syria’s 
resources than the government’s continuous promotion of irrigation in the agricultural sector.193 
Hence, a resource problem with a political basis rather than an ecological basis. However, the 
Syrian government succeeds in naturalizing scarcity through framing and presenting the country’s 
resources in a static way, which then leads to water management policies responding to that static 
view. Besides, water scarcity is being disconnected from its political, international, and historical 
context. The spatial (geographical, natural) division of water resources as outlined by the state 
forms a geographical frame within which the conceptualization of scarcity and plans to address it 
are being formed.194 By framing its resource problems this way, the Syrian state communicates 
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from within the ecological discourse. This shifts the blame from human-induced water 
mismanagement to a simple natural scarcity of water resources. Additional critique on cooperation 
with foreign experts has focused on the discourse of power asymmetry it reinforces. Equally, 
concern has been voiced over international water policies that may lead to exploitation at the local 
level.195 What is interesting, is that we see how the Syrian government frames its water problems in 
different ways at different levels or in different contexts. 
 Politicizing national water management – a  view from inside through the SDWC 
How do these critiques on the framing of the Syrian water problem relate to the practice of water 
management? Because of their extensive fieldwork in Syria and their contacts with different Syrian 
officials, the SDWC and their experiences provide insights here. Their reports sketch a quite 
nuanced view of the role of the Syrian government. In 2010 the experts signal a developing “sense 
of urgency” amongst the Syrian government regarding the water situation in the country. Whilst 
they are critical of the human contributions to water mismanagement, they are also (modestly) 
positive about what they perceive as a shifting attitude of the government towards the importance 
of water management. The Syrian State Planning Commission would introduce a section specifically 
addressing water problems in its eleventh Five Year Plan (2011-2016). Moreover, it is argued that 
the State Planning Commission increasingly regards water scarcity as an urgent question to which 
funds must be allocated.196 
The technical and practical reports and papers of the SDWC provide insights from a 
different angle into the role of the Syrian government in water management and its water narrative 
at the national level. Three important lines can be discerned about Syrian water management in the 
Orontes basin. First, the strong lack of cooperation and consequent lack of control between the 
different involved parties. Second, the Syrian wish for a national water strategy. This brings to mind 
the national agricultural policy that did not fit the diversity of the country and resulted in a lack of 
economic alternatives for part of the Syrian population. And third, the non-compliance to 
freshwater agreements with Lebanon and Turkey. As local water experts argued, the agreements 
are more ‘gentlemen’s agreements – generally observed, but not set in stone.’197 This carries the 
threat of international political instability. Hence – again – a role for questions of security. 
Particularly the first and the second observation offer practical information to complement 
or counter academic arguments. Cooperation between the various parties involved in the water 
sector in Syria is the first important topic in Syrian water management. Integration and cooperation 
of the different sectors and ministries is necessary, the SDWC experts argue, for food security 
policies cannot properly exist without water security. Likewise, industrial development cannot take 
place without water needed for the processing and production needs.198 These related interests 
result at the national level in the involvement of both vertically organized and horizontally 
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operating layers of government. Vertically organized ‘water demand’ ministries like the Ministry of 
Irrigation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, the Ministry of Industry, and the 
Ministry of Environment are important parties in the water sector. Horizontal, policy-oriented 
ministries like the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Local Affairs 
interact with them. A 2010 SDWC position paper marks the lack of an integrated policy, legal, and 
institutional framework regarding the sectors drinking water, waste water, agriculture, irrigation, 
environment, and industry.  It states that at the national level key policies and goals of the different 
ministries are separately presented. Therefore, increased integration and cooperation of all sectors 
is essential for sustainable development.199 In fact, this is a practical echo of Hinnebusch’ argument 
on the strains to top-down bureaucratic agricultural development.200 
The earlier-mentioned critiques on water management and international cooperation are 
not only related to the framing but also to the scalar level at which the cooperation takes place. The 
SDWC operated at the national, governorate, and local level and identified problems and solutions 
on various scalar levels. In the position paper the need to create a link between the different levels 
of society is emphasized, where local realities are connected to and fed back at the national policy 
level. Communication and feedback between the different levels as well as clearly designated tasks 
and responsibilities at each level need to be improved.201 At the national level, the long-term 
objective of the cooperation was to create a Syrian water strategy that manages and uses the 
available water resources in a sustainable manner, and effectively protects the resources from 
pollution. An effective and integrative national water strategy that aims to manage the available 
Syrian water resources in a sustainable and effective manner is necessary for regional planning. 
The different scalar levels are closely connected. The SDWC stresses that at all levels the efficacy, 
reduction and sustainability of water use should be prioritized, as well as the attainment of 
acceptable water quality. Water infrastructures need to be strengthened and more monitoring 
networks need to be developed. Ownership and responsibility at the national but also at the 
regional and local level need to be established.202 
Barnes’ conceptualization of scarcity takes place at the national level and her critique 
consequently also focuses on that level. The SDWC harbored the view that the national level should 
have a general overview of the water situation in Syria and is responsible for policy making and 
legislation, while at the regional or local level the stakeholders should actually implement the 
measures and need to be involved in defining solutions for local problems and challenges, which 
need to be enabled at the national level.203 The emphasis is on interaction between different scalar 
levels and particular attention to stakeholders and dynamics at the local level. Moreover, because of 
the focus on the Orontes basin and specific research in pilot areas on the ground, the SDWC put 
together a geographical framework based on its own measures and research, rather than one based 
on the state’s propagated scarcity. An analysis of the SDWC thus to a certain extent counters and 
refutes the academic critique on international collaboration and water management, although it 
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also confirms the ecological framing that Barnes mentioned. This is reflected in their local pilot 
research.   
On-the-ground research into Syrian water scarcity was conducted by the SDWC in 
designated pilot areas and by an exploratory mission into the Euphrates region. The pilot areas 
were selected after the creation of the surface- and groundwater models. Stakeholders were 
identified at various levels and contacts established. For the Qusair pilot area, operational water 
losses, pollution, climatic change, and diplomatic relations with Lebanon were identified as the 
main threats. In the Mhardeh pilot area, water quality problems, shortages of surface water supply 
and serious over-exploitation of groundwater, and – again – climate change were designated. 
Problems in the Khan Shaykhun area are decreased precipitation due to climate change, and a 
continuous drawdown of the groundwater.204 In November 2009, the SDWC also undertook a 
reconnaissance survey into the Euphrates River and Khabour River valleys. The most important 
identified problems were groundwater pollution and salinization due to mistakes in irrigation 
practices and the absence of proper drainage systems. Again, they argued that climate change will 
result in decreased precipitation and consequently a higher variability in the Euphrates River.205 To 
improve the conditions and particularly to prevent worse scenarios for the future, the SDWC 
indicated that government regulation and law enforcement were urgently needed.206  
 
4.5 A Syrian narrative? 
 
What is particularly interesting in the evaluation of these pilots is how on the one hand critique on 
the state’s water management is voiced, but on the other hand climate change and population 
growth and its consequences are emphasized, thus “relieving” the government of some 
responsibility for the situation. This is in line with Barnes’ argument of the Syrian framing of 
resource problems. But it is important to discern between the national and the local level. The 
SDWC documents are in this regard particularly informative for the local level, whereas Barnes’ 
critique focuses on the broader Syrian management.  
From the Syrian side, the director of the project Omar al-Shamali and the Homs Directorate 
of Water Resources have composed a small booklet in combined English and Arabic on the 
Integrated Water Resource Management Plan Orontes Basin. This book offers an insight into the 
Syrian sentiments regarding the SDWC and the narrative it carries to an international and Syrian 
audience alike. The images it disperses are both geographically and socially grounded: one the one 
hand, the emphasis is put on the limited amount of water in the Orontes basin, low recharge rates 
due to low precipitation and soil conditions, and climate change. On the other hand, the booklet 
describes the historical and traditional importance of the river, intensive multi-purpose use 
(drinking water, farming, industries, recreation and tourism), and population growth. Irresponsible 
governance or mismanagement of resources by the Syrian regime is somewhat swept under the 
rug. While the authors clearly identify the six most pressing problems in the basin – as mentioned 
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earlier – the causers of these issues are not explicitly named, although the Syrian population is 
indicted of low awareness regarding the resource problem:  
 
Most of the population takes the availability of water for granted. It is taken for 
granted that the resources will be sufficient for current and future use. Leakages 
and wasting of water is easily accepted, and the river is being used as a dump in 
many places.207 
The Syrian population comes off rather badly compared to the modest tone to which the 
government is treated when the issue of irrigation and infrastructure is mentioned:  
The Syrian administration recognizes that modernization of the irrigation 
infrastructure by far provides the best opportunity to reduce water demand. It has 
developed a large program to support the conversion from old to modern 
irrigation structures.208 
Overall, however, mismanagement by the government is not mentioned at all. For example, when 
the authors note that state-built dams and infrastructures have had large impact on the 
watercourse of the Orontes, the message is carried across as neutral as possible.209 
Based on this booklet, the National Agricultural Policy Center report, and the Five Year 
Plans of the Syrian government, the argument that the Syrian regime puts the blame for water 
scarcity on climate change and increased consumption by the population, not only at the 
international but also at the national level, is proven valid. In what Barnes has termed the Syrian 
government’s narrative on water resources and water availability in Syria, emphasis is placed on 
geographical and natural factors rather than human agency. Here, water is politicized by presenting 
it through the ecological discourse. This obscures the state’s historical mismanagement. The 
criticisms of Barnes but also of those authors like De Châtel that have linked Syrian water 
mismanagement to the current crisis are therefore justified with regard to the national level.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
Water management at the national level has been politicized in a different way than at the 
international level. In the previous chapter I introduced the term “pragmatic strategies” to describe 
the pillars of Syria’s hydro-diplomacy. Here, not only the state’s scarcity narrative but also its 
cooperation with international experts and its developmental policies in the service of 
centralization and power-consolidation efforts may be regarded as pragmatic strategies at the 
national level. Through these collaborations, as Barnes argued, the state had an opportunity to 
disseminate its conceptualization of scarcity within a geographical framework. Consequently, 
Syrian national water management has been politicized via a more ecological narrative than the 
distributional narrative of the international level.  
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A brief case study of the SDWC served as a practical counterbalance to confirm or reject 
these academic ideas regarding political water management. Besides, it offered important and 
interesting insights in water conditions at the local level. The documents and experiences of the 
SDWC suggest a wish and willingness to contribute to the water problems by the Syrian state – to a 
certain extent. The SDWC experts are also critical of the Syrian government in the various 
mentioned ways, but are at the same time mildly optimistic about the impending changes they 
expected right before the outbreak of the crisis. Their reports suggest a gradual shift from a sectoral 
to an integral approach by the Syrian government and a democratization of water policies from 
2009 onwards. They argue that the Syrian government is increasingly receptive to their ideas, 
willing to improve internal coordination, and eager to expand the cooperation. Furthermore, they 
are carefully optimistic about Syria’s move towards market liberalization and the benefits that 
might stow upon agriculture and water policies and management, if past mistakes are avoided and 
integrated management implemented in all sectors involved.210  
The SDWC documents move beyond the academic discourse here by noting a stimulus of 
change right before the revolution started. On the one hand, this small, practical case study thus 
indicates developments that may otherwise have gone unnoted. On the other hand, the SDWC is not 
free of political biases or agendas itself, as I will problematize in the next chapter. The cooperation 
arguably created awareness of the water problem among local governorates with its emphasis on 
vision, strategy, sustainability, and long-term thinking. A practical focus on the local level 
consequently offers a more nuanced view of Syrian water management. It also shows the 
differences between the politicized water management of the national level, and indicated a lack of 
knowledge among officials in water management at the local level. In the SDWC program, 
differences between the local and the national level were used to provide feedback to evaluate and 
possibly adjust national level policies. 
It is also necessary to reflect on the argument of the developmental function of water. 
During the consolidation of the Assad regime in the second half of the twentieth century, the Syrian 
state sought development and modernization through agricultural innovation and water projects. 
Their hydraulic mission was part of their state building and was also meant to enhance 
centralization processes and the legitimacy of the state. Selby argued that the ‘centralization of 
control over water through the construction of large-scale supply infrastructures has been a 
powerful instrument in the consolidation of administrative state power over territories and 
populations.’211 However,  
 
Yet on the other hand, the costliness and difficulty of controlling water resources 
and infrastructures, and the local importance of those resources within rural 
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areas, can also place heavy demands on the state, can exacerbate tensions 
between local communities and hence can aid and abet processes of state 
collapse.212 
 
Water management can thus be rendered a tool for development and state building, but 
mismanagement renders water a potential tool for conflict, vulnerability, and risk. Consequently, 
national and local water management can also be gathered under the encompassing paradigm of 
conflict or cooperation. In the case of Syria, mismanagement of water resources was nationally 
driven by the importance attached to agriculture and by the desire for food security. This resulted 
in policies without sustainable outlooks.  
The British geographer J.A. Allan wrote in 2003 that in the Middle East ‘water policy is made 
behind a veil of ignorance on the basis of unsustainable economic and environmental 
assumptions.’213 Lifting this veil would result in serious political instability and jeopardize security.  
Therefore, nationally and internationally, agricultural policies, water resources and water 
management are highly sensitive topics and “red lines”.214 Static water management is a result of 
this. The SDWC documents pose that the challenge of water management is political rather than 
technical. They estimate that their proposals for IWRM in the Orontes basin could result in 
diminishing the required amount of water for irrigation up to fifty percent. But their counterpart, 
the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, insisted in its focus on development and infrastructure rather than 
sustainable management. This shows the connectedness between the relative availability of water 
and its management: relative availability is negatively impacted by mismanagement. But it 
indicates more than that: it also shows conflicting paradigms of thinking and reference between the 
Syrian state on the one hand, and international experts on the other hand. While the Syrian state 
politicized water management through emphasizing ecological boundaries and difficulties, 
international experts politicize water via a thorough technical message. In the next chapter I will 
further analyze this technical politicizing.  
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Chapter 5. Water as a tool for democracy – global water management215  
 
In the previous chapters the political functions of water in Syria have been examined at the 
international and the national and (partly) local level. The different functions of water as a tool for 
diplomacy and development, but also as a military tool as analyzed in the introduction to this thesis 
have confirmed the reigning paradigm that water can be either a tool for cooperation or conflict. In 
Syria, water is surrounded by political sensitivities that underlie pragmatic strategies in both 
international and national water management. Water is presented through a prism of power 
asymmetry, security, and a neo-Malthusianist notion of water scarcity, and combined with a more 
liberal-technical and pragmatic approach to the resource and its restraints and possibilities.  
 In this final chapter, the research question of water as a political tool in Syria will be 
deepened by extending its scope to different actors involved in politicizing water. In the 
introduction to the thesis military water usage by both the Syrian regime and opposition parties 
was examined, but in the analysis of diplomatic and developmental water usage the Syrian state 
figured as the most important actor. In the previous chapter on water as a tool for development and 
the politicizing of water management at the national and local level I identified cooperation with 
international experts as one of the pragmatic strategies the Syrian state used. But turned around, 
these international experts may as well have their own political agenda or goals. Hence, if analyzing 
how water can be politicized in different ways, the question of the actor must be taken into account. 
In this chapter, the global agenda of international players will be problematized through analyzing 
the potential of water as a tool for democracy.216  
 
5.1 Research on global water management  
 
Throughout this thesis the “international community”217 has featured in several ways. With regard 
to Syria, the international community comprises the collective of countries assembled in the UN 
Security Council that cannot agree on a solution for the Syrian conflict. It comprises the coalition of 
countries that in September 2014 vowed to jointly combat ISIS. But projects like the SDWC can also 
be regarded as a part of the agenda or sphere of influence of the international community.  
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 Whereas the Syrian state politically and economically officially propagated a socialist-
oriented message, scholars argue that the international community has historically managed a 
capitalist neoliberal agenda for the MENA region – including its water sector.218 In a highly 
interesting 2013 book, political scientist Adam Hanieh (severely) criticizes this neoliberal agenda 
from a Marxist political-economic perspective.219 He argues that the Arab Spring uprisings were in 
fact protests against the “free market” economic policies that Western institutions in the MENA 
region long championed. But international financial institutions (IFIs) framed the uprisings as 
essentially political rather than economic in nature, protesting the authoritarian state. According to 
Hanieh, however, ‘the authoritarian guise of the Middle Eastern state is not anomalous and 
antagonistic to capitalism, but is rather a particular form or appearance of capitalism in the Middle 
Eastern context.’220  
 From the second half of the twentieth century onwards, the MENA region has been pushed 
towards a neoliberal and capitalist transformation. Financial tools, interdependency policies, 
privatization, and the consolidation of authoritarian regimes or even dictatorships were the most 
important instruments employed, according to Hanieh.221 Reforming the water and energy sectors 
was an important goal. In the 2000s a wave of privatization took place, but governments across the 
region continued to provide many essential services, like water. Hydrological infrastructural 
networks generally remained state-owned, and neoliberal governments from 2005 onwards 
realized the potential profits if these service provisions were privatized. Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) were set up, in which a private company provides a service in contract with 
the government. In the water sector, different tasks such as water distribution, treatment, and 
storage were contracted to different providers.222 In agriculture, liberalization policies in the 1990s 
and 2000s have throughout the region resulted in domination and ownership by key families, 
foreign agribusiness, and the state on the one hand, and dispossession and proletarianization of 
large parts of the rural population on the other hand.223 Hanieh emphasizes that IFIs like the World 
Bank claim to have a neutral agenda to:  
 
[…]obscure the relations of power that structure neoliberal reform. [They] 
naturalize the global system as an external, inevitable, and almost irresistible 
force. [By framing] in this manner these institutions conceal the relations of 
power that hide behind capitalism, portraying policy as simply a technocratic 
and necessary response to changing external circumstances. Their own role as 
architects of these relations of power is hidden […].224 
 
In Syria, as could already be seen in chapter two, a gradual liberalization of the economy took place 
since the mid-1980s, and Bashar al-Assad embarked from 2005 onwards on a neoliberal reform 
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program. Policies of privatization, opening up to foreign investment, and removing state control in 
some key industrial sectors were part of the program. Hanieh argues that the (already-mentioned) 
reversal of agrarian reforms led to private farms appropriating a lot of underground water. 
According to him, this was an important factor behind the developing water crisis through the mid-
2000s. Coupled with the drought and the large internal displacements, the ‘roots of the Syrian 
uprising lie in an attempt to overthrow an autocratic regime presiding over a highly polarized 
neoliberal economy.’225  
This is a different side of the coin. Analyzed in this vein, any technical hydrological 
improvement is not neutral but must be seen as part of an international agenda, as Hanieh claims. 
Consequently, technical water management can be regarded as politicization of water via the 
technical discourse. In the previous chapter, scholarly critique on international cooperation was 
mentioned. The criticism mainly focused on how the Syrian state presented water scarcity through 
a certain framework to international experts. If this is turned around as well, criticism on 
international water cooperation of international actors with nation states has come mainly from the 
angle of water governance. The American geographer Michele-Lee Moore argues that global 
organizations in water management are practitioner-centric and consequently favor a technical 
approach that is driven towards building infrastructure for water services for irrigation, industrial, 
and domestic use.226 She dubs this a “hydraulic mission” – the same term that was earlier used for 
the developmental policies of the Syrian state, but then employed from a different angle. This 
hydraulic mission approach, that has ‘[…] long fitted within the dominant culture for Western, 
scientific, rational thinking’227, has resulted in a rigidity in water management due to the 
institutionalization of the technical approach. Moreover, Moore argues that the technical approach 
has led to a depoliticization of water governance and water management. Because the political 
aspect is ignored in favor of the prioritizing of the technical side, the social, political, and 
institutional dimensions to decisions about water remain underexposed and are neutralized.228  
Next to neutralizing political agendas, Moore argues that the actors behind water 
management are obscured. While the state is the first official authority in water management – as 
was outlined earlier – global institutions like UN branches proliferate. Moore criticizes this shift, 
arguing that between these institutions there is little debate on water management and water 
governance; merely, experiences are shared.229  
 
5.2 Politicizing global water management in Syria 
 
Following these arguments and combining them with Hanieh’s critique, global institutions, IFIs, and 
foreign governments seem to act along two political-economic lines in the MENA region. First, they 
present a move towards neoliberalism and capitalism as a somewhat inevitable drive towards 
globalization and modernization. Moves in desirable directions are rewarded via financial funding 
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and aid, while moves in different directions are discouraged via debts and rising interest rates. And 
second, this neoliberal agenda is neutralized through concealing less-celebratory parts of that 
agenda: the erosion of social security and subsidies, the dynamics it gave to authoritarian regimes, 
of which Hanieh says that ‘[…] these essential facts of history remain an inconvenient truth for 
those who today attempt to link neoliberal reform with “democracy”.’230  
 Two questions arise. How do these ideas relate to the practices of (globally-inspired) 
developments in the Syrian water sector? And what instruments does the international community 
have to politicize water via their neoliberal agenda? A reflection on changes in Syrian water 
management and an analysis of current Syria policies of the Dutch government and the UN serve to 
compare these ideas to the Syrian practice. 
 
 Developments in the Syrian water sector 
To what extent is the outlined critique applicable to the Syrian water sector? This political-
economic agenda would have three consequences for Syrian water management. First, the Syrian 
state would have to jump on the bandwagon of privatization in the agricultural and water sector if 
it was to stay on board in today’s modernized and globalized world – and indeed it has been doing 
so since the mid-1980s. Second, Hanieh also argued that the water sector would be divided across 
different providers via the construction of Public-Private Partnerships. As the examination of the 
SDWC showed, the Syrian water sector was embedded in a dense bureaucracy with a range of 
different – sometimes competing rather than cooperating – ministries involved. The Syrian 
government was receptive towards PPPs. For example, a Syrian-German project between Syrian 
ministries and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) resulted in PPPs on 
wastewater treatment in the Syrian village of Jdeidet Yabous at the end of 2009.231 Earlier that year, 
a large conference in Damascus was organized, outlining possibilities for PPPs in key infrastructural 
sectors, and sponsored by national and international banks, organizations, and ministries. The 
conference was organized at the request of the Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Abdullah al-Dardari.232  
Furthermore, following Hanieh’s critique, cooperation with international experts (and 
moneylenders) would be largely dependent on their terms, meaning a technical approach to water 
management, disconnecting it from its political ties. Here again, the SDWC offers some insights that 
cannot solely be derived from scholarly literature. It sheds light on the cooperation between a 
Middle Eastern state on the one hand, and technical international experts on the other hand. An 
examination of the SDWC showed how the Syrian state presented its water problems to 
international experts and how the state displayed a willingness to alter water policies to a certain 
extent – if “red lines” were not crossed. The SDWC cooperation fits within the general economic 
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liberalization pattern in Syria as described by Haddad. In the cooperation between the parties, 
conflicting paradigms were at work as the two parties presented and interpreted the difficulties of 
the Syrian water sector in different ways. On the one hand, through cooperation with international 
technical experts the veil of ignorance surrounding Syrian water policymaking could be (partly) 
lifted. The SDWC created awareness of Syria’s most pressing water problems and provided possible 
technical solutions for it. They handed the Syrian officials the tools and instruments that would lead 
to more sustainable water management. At the same time, the SDWC indeed strengthened a 
technical approach to water governance and management; their documents point to political 
challenges rather than technical ones in advices for a future water sector. Besides, a neoliberal whiff 
can be seen in their aim of strategic policy development at the national level, and more clearly in 
their open optimism on Syria’s move towards market liberalization.233   
Consequently, neoliberalism has not been lost on the Syrian water sector. Cutting 
agricultural and fuel subsidies, introducing (and increasing) average prices for water – rather than 
providing water at highly subsidized rates, as the Syrian state until the 2000s did234 – and 
encouraging private sector commitment all fit within the international neoliberal agenda Hanieh 
outlined. Equally, the predominantly technical approach that the international community employs 
in cooperation within the Syrian water sector, criticized by Moore, can be seen. But, importantly, 
Haddad argues that:  
 
Syria’s liberalization experience has been an affair of the regime that has not been 
determined or guided from abroad […]. This is significant since much of the 
available literature on reform experiences in […] the Arab world emphasizes the 
leverage of IFIs over indebted countries: “Indebtedness has given international 
actors a stick with which to push these countries towards policies of economic 
reform”.235  
 
Syria has had a low level of long-term foreign debt compared to other Arab countries. Accordingly, 
Haddad speaks of an empirical absence of IFIs in the Syrian experience: ‘the absence of such 
conditionalities has stripped from the state the opportunity to lay blame on external factors for the 
failure of economic reforms.’236 This indicates that Hanieh’s broad Marxist account of the policies of 
capitalism and neoliberalism in the MENA region becomes too general if individual countries are 
examined. But more importantly, it also means that the international players would have had less 
leverage in Syria because one of its (financial) instruments – funding and debts – would have had 
less impact on Syrian policies. This may have deepened Syrian – political and economic – opposition 
against the regime as the regime did not have a clear scapegoat for deteriorating economic 
conditions. Subsequently, the Syrian revolution, in a perhaps ironical twist, may in its turn have 
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strengthened the position of international players vis-à-vis Syria, as the current conflict drags on. 
This is speculation to some degree, but it is in this regard interesting to briefly examine what 
instruments the international players have or may employ in the current conflict to politicize water. 
 
 Politicizing water in the current Syrian conflict 
As this thesis opened with a window on the current conflict in Syria, its empirical part closes with a 
reference to the conflict as well: first, an analysis of the Syria policies of the Netherlands, and 
second, an analysis of current UN policies on Syria.  
Dutch policies on Syria and the larger MENA region are interesting to examine for a 
practically-grounded analysis of the above-outlined neoliberal agenda and the tools the 
international community can employ to politicize water. The Netherlands is keen on profiling itself 
on the niche of water and water management. In October 2014 the president of the World Bank 
Kim and the Dutch minister of International Trade and Development Cooperation Ploumen signed a 
covenant that assigned the Netherlands a prominent role in worldwide water questions. Moreover, 
recently – 12 March 2015 – the Netherlands named a special water envoy who will further develop 
and advance the Dutch international water ambitions. Thus far this envoy is unique in his sort.237  
The Dutch integrated approach to Syria, as outlined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
September 2014238, is based on four tracks: politics, development, security, and accountability.239 
The developmental track consists of several parts. First, one million euro is placed at the disposal of 
the Dutch special Syria envoy each year. With this budget the special envoy, based in Gaziantep in 
Turkey, can locally initiate small “quick impact projects”. This can be employed at the terrain of 
water supply. Second, two million euro is explicitly reserved for the sustainable reconstruction of 
the water supply. And third, the Netherlands plays an active role in the working group of the 
Friends of Syria240 concerning Economic Recovery and Development.241 Part of the Dutch policy 
regarding Syria is thus specifically dedicated to financial support to the water sector.   
 The Dutch water strategy in the MENA region is built upon the notion of water as a possible 
instrument for renewed stability.242 On a global level, it focuses on a contribution to the policy 
dialogue regarding water, agriculture, and food security in order to prevent conflict and stimulate 
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economic development. On a macro-level, it emphasizes the importance of hydro-diplomacy. On a 
meso- and micro-level, capacity-building in the water- and agricultural sector and the support of 
water and irrigation projects within regional development are key to the strategy. Dutch companies 
and knowledge institutions in the water- and agricultural sector need to be actively engaged at the 
local level. The Syrian-Dutch Water Cooperation (SDWC) is considered to be exemplary for this 
strategy.243 Generally, water is designated as a theme that can bring about a possible positive 
political spin-off.244 In this regard, Track II initiatives via companies and knowledge institutions can 
serve as possible instruments.  
 Track II initiatives are informal and non-binding dialogues that can form an initial 
rapprochement between different parties.245 In this vein, water could be used to employ Track II 
initiatives, if its mediating and reconstructing possibilities are recognized. In the Euphrates-Tigris 
River basin, a Track II initiative came into being in 2005: the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for 
Cooperation (ETIC) – a cooperation between academics from Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and the United 
States aimed at sustainable collaboration and regional development.246 Its underlying idea was that 
in international relations, nongovernmental experts can influence governmental decision-making, 
and in this case ETIC could ‘pave the way for the resumption of official discussions over shared 
water resources.’247 Technical cooperation over water between experts, then, was seen as an initial 
step towards international cooperation at the governmental level. This way, Track II initiatives can 
serve as an instrument for the international community to first enter a certain (conflict) situation 
and subsequently promote a technical, neoliberal path as a way to a solution. Such non-
governmental initiatives are not only supported but also promoted by (Western) governments, as 
the investigation into Dutch policies showed.  
The United Nations has since the beginning of the crisis acted in various ways. Most 
important for our argument here, are brief analyses of the work of their Food and Agricultural 
Organization (UN-FAO), and of the earlier-mentioned UN-ESCWA (Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia). The FAO has focused on agriculture and food access and availability 
in Syria in the current crisis. The 2014 Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan that is 
outlined in the report reserves 900.000 US dollar for the rehabilitation of damaged on-farm 
irrigation canals.248 
UN-ESCWA has in 2013 initiated the National Agenda for the Future of Syria. In partnership 
with Syrian national institutions, civil society, the Syrian private sector, and UN and international 
organizations, the program is meant to indicate concrete development needs for Syria that underlie 
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the National Agenda, and to promote democracy and development in the wider MENA region.249 
Within the National Agenda, a specific Work Group Water headed by the Syrian Dr. Wael Seif, who 
was previously resident project manager of the SDWC, formulated a National Water Agenda for 
Syria in December 2014.250 Their most important long-term (ten years) considerations are 
developing a vision on sustainable water-management, creating the enabling conditions to 
implement National IWRM, developing and implementing a National Drought Strategy, and 
optimizing the Syrian share of Euphrates-Tigris basin waters. If water policies adhere to these 
principles, this will result in fulfilling the water vision ESCWA formulated for Syria: ‘Syria’s water 
resources are sustainably and equitably managed to contribute to achieving socio-economic 
development and resilience.’251  
Next to Track II initiatives that emphasize the merits of a technical approach, funding and a 
democratic development agenda are two other instruments that can be used by the international 
community to technically politicize water management in pursuit of their agenda in the current 
Syrian crisis. In this regard, funding may be labeled a pragmatic strategy as well, often responding 
to acute needs. Track II initiatives and the promotion of a democratic development agenda for Syria 
and its water sector breathe a longer-term view. The fact that a former Syrian co-operator of the 
SDWC presides over the Work Group Water for the National Water Agenda for Syria is interesting; 
it shows something of the attitude that (educated) Syrians may have towards a neoliberal agenda 
for their country. While De Châtel argued that the local Syrian residents she interviewed were 
mostly skeptical to the neoliberal changes as it meant increased taxation and payments252, this 
shows that there are two sides to every story. 
The same can be concluded with regard to the question of the actor. This last chapter 
showed that the political dynamics of water can be used by several parties. Consequently, water can 
be regarded not only as a tool that the Syrian state can use vis-à-vis its riparian neighbors or its 
own citizens; non-state actors like opposition or rebel parties, but also “external” forces like global 
institutions and international players can employ water to pursue their own political or economic 
agendas or “hydraulic missions”. This can happen in either a crisis situation – like the current 
military water use showed – or more gradually – like this chapter indicated. This last case can again 
be related to the security prism:  true to the technical discourse water is often regarded as a tool for 
possible cooperation.  
 
5.3 Conclusions 
 
This brings us effectively to the last questions of this thesis. After having criticized Syrian 
(historical) water management and national and international political agendas vis-à-vis the Syrian 
water sector, the question stands out on what course Syrian water management should then 
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embark. What plausible alternatives are there to either the socialist or the liberalization course that 
the state has taken since the advent of the Ba’th party? What is acceptable sustainable water 
management for all parties, and how could it be reached despite conflicting political agendas? How 
does the theory of these agendas relate to the practice? To what extent does a neoliberal agenda in 
the current Syrian crisis matter, if it is aimed at alleviating Syrian suffering in the short run? But 
also: what consequences would this have in the long run? And: how do the consequences of the 
political dynamics of water influence actual water management “on the ground”? 
 Although the SDWC did shed some light on water management at the smaller-scale local 
level, the theorizing of the politicization of water has largely been confined to the broader levels for 
two reasons. First, the documents of the SDWC, alongside smaller-scale research like De Châtel 
conducted in Syria, indicate that at the Syrian village level political dynamics around water were 
rather ad-hoc dynamics, dependent on everyday developments and individual alliances. Thus, 
pragmatic attitudes rather than pragmatic strategies. But, second, knowledge on water 
management at the local level is simply not that developed with regard to Syria. The here-
conducted research has been aimed at providing a historically-based account of the political 
dynamics involved in water management. Most smaller-scale basin-focused research on Syrian 
water management has been conducted and written by international organizations and 
partnerships like GTZ or the SDWC. But compact, ethnographic research of local Syrian water 
management has not been undertaken.  
 In a highly interesting 2005 article, Jan Selby compares oil and water and their potential for 
resource conflicts from an economic perspective, questioning ‘whether the political economy of 
water is such that water could one day become as great a cause of friction and violence as oil.’253 
This, he argues, is contrary to the water-wars-thesis not the case. Possible water conflicts would 
have a local character, in contrast to intra-state oil conflicts. But the oil-water analogy with an 
emphasis on conflict and destruction results in international neglect of the actual, smaller-scale 
local situation on the ground.254 Equally, the SDWC warned in 2010 that ‘current, human-induced 
water practices will seriously, and negatively, affect the country’s socio-economic development in 
the near future.’255 These practices included first and foremost the drilling of (illegal) wells by the 
rural Syrian population. Local level research would thus not only advance scholarly knowledge on 
(the politics surrounding) Syrian water management; it would also be highly useful in a practical 
vein to disclose actual practices that may lead to increased stress over water resources.   
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Conclusions: pragmatic strategies, political sensitivities, local dynamics 
 
In 1995 a World Bank Report spelled disaster for the water resources in the Middle East and North 
Africa. If regional agreements and international cooperation were not acutely established, the 
vicious downward spiral of water availability would have dire consequences.256 At present, twenty 
years past this report, the MENA region faces a period of possibly unprecedented crises, animosity, 
and instability. This thesis opened with the alarming messages of the military use of water in Syria 
and Iraq. In Syria the Assad regime as well as rebel forces and the Islamic State (ISIS) have attacked 
hydrological infrastructures and have cut water supplies. In Iraq, fighting has concentrated around 
dams. Yemen is ‘tearing itself apart’ over its chronic water shortages, which Al-Qaeda on the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is ready to exploit.257 Libya’s aquatic reserves ‘will be a large prize for 
whoever gets the upper hand’258 in the continuous struggles. But also in ostensibly more stable 
countries, water resources are under threat. In Egypt, for example, the extremist group Wilayat al-
Sinai, believed to be allied to ISIS, has recently carried out attacks on water stations.259 Terrorists, 
rebel groups, and shifty states all seem to endanger the water resources and obstruct regional and 
international cooperation over water. 
A deeper research into these messages of water as a weapon in Syria formed the initial 
foundation to this thesis. Upon a closer examination of the military use of water and the academic 
discourse on water in the MENA region and Syria, however, two interesting matters came to the 
fore. First, the use of water as a weapon fitted within an academic discourse in which water is 
regarded as a political commodity rather than as a natural resource. If water is regarded as a 
political commodity, it can be employed as a tool to pursue political goals via the use of certain 
instruments. And second – related to this – it turned out that ISIS or rebel forces were not the 
principal impellent behind using water as a weapon. Rather, the Syrian state has an interesting 
history of political water use in various ways. Equally, non-state actors have politicized water for 
their own agendas, and ISIS’ and other groups’ military water use is in this regard not unique.  
These findings led to a restructuring of the research. The overarching research question 
remained the same: how can water be regarded as a political tool in Syria? From the existing 
literature, the principal paradigm of water as a tool for conflict or cooperation was adopted. Within 
this paradigm, three discourses exist through which water can be politicized. An integrative 
historical approach to the topic was adopted, and the role of human agency in water management 
as well as the “relative availability” of water were emphasized. The abundant literature on 
international water negotiations led to the first designation of and a chapter on water as a tool for 
diplomacy at the international level. However, water management at the national and local level 
with the second designation of water as a tool for development proved to be a less-trodden but 
equally if not more important subject for research. Historical and practical research in the form of a 
case study indicated that the national and – related – the local level are highly important to take 
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into account when researching political water use. This more empirical and practical chapter 
subsequently led to the final chapter, in which the question of water as a tool for democracy was 
posed. While the Syrian state – government, regime – initially figured as the central actor, the 
international community was designated as the subject of the last chapter. 
 
 Reflections on the research 
 
Water and water management have proven to be dense and complicated topics wherein a multitude 
of factors and various scholarly disciplines play a role. I chose history as the leading discipline in my 
research, with a historical approach based on the integrative, total history of Fernand Braudel and 
the Annales School. An integrative historical approach to issues that are to a certain extent highly 
topical is quite novel, but satisfactorily served the purposes here. It showed the inherent 
shortcomings in solely researching the highly visible military use of water: because of its focus on 
histoire événementielle, the wider political background of narratives and actors is obscured. A 
predominantly historical approach also meant partly ruling out other disciplines. Political science, 
environmental sciences, and international relations are leading angles from which much research 
on water resources and water management has been conducted. While I partly incorporated these 
disciplines into the historical approach by researching geographical and ecological characteristics 
of river basins as well as different possibilities of diplomacy, they remained subordinate to the 
overarching historical account. Furthermore, because of this novel approach to the topic, the 
nation-state (Syria before the current crisis) appeared as the most important space of inquiry. In 
scholarly literature, basin-wide research has often been favored, but those examinations mostly do 
not include the national or local level. Vice versa, research focused on these smaller levels often 
excludes international basin-wide (geo)politics. Selecting the national context as the dominant 
focus allowed for the inclusions of different scalar levels of analysis. At the same time, this resulted 
in the exclusion of regional and larger international political dynamics. Comparative research on 
water management in the larger MENA region must be conducted more extensively, as I argued 
earlier in the thesis. Comparisons with, for example, the interesting politics of water management 
in Saudi Arabia, or with the hydrological challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian context, may serve to 
advance future research on hydrological matters amongst different backgrounds.  
Methodologically, the political orientation and topicality of the subject presented some 
challenges regarding source material. By undertaking a case study based on the documents of the 
SDWC, I was able to get access to primary materials and compare and contrast academic arguments 
to practical, technically-oriented research “on the ground”. Combined with the documents of the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs I gathered, I could compose a reasonable assessment of the views 
and agendas of the international community vis-à-vis Syrian water management. Additionally, talks 
to a Dutch expert of the SDWC and to a journalist who had spent many years in Syria allowed me to 
partly overcome the hindrance of being unable to do fieldwork. Using a broad variety of sources 
also – again – resulted in the incorporation of different levels of analysis (international, national, 
local, global) in this thesis. It also served the purpose of the broader historical, partly theoretical 
research that was conducted here, rather than, for example, small-scale, ethnographical research. 
Consequently, cultural, religious, or ethical connotations of water were left out. But these dynamics 
67 
 
of water must not be cast aside. Research that focuses more exclusively on citizens or populations 
and their relation to water must be sure to take these connotations into account. 
 
 Water as a political tool? 
 
These evaluations bring us to back to the larger research question of water as a political tool in 
Syria. The dominant, discourse-transcending paradigm of water resources stimulating either 
conflict or cooperation remained upright at the different levels of analysis, and was intimately tied 
to questions of security for the different actors. The research meant to deepen this paradigm 
through a thorough exploration of the politicizing of water in relation to a specific country. The 
focus on human agency assigned an important role to water management. In relation to Syrian 
water management, consequently, the terms “relative availability” and “pragmatic strategies” were 
coined. Relative availability was central in my plea for a political approach to the subject. Although 
geographical history and ecological realities cannot be simply swept aside, they must not be 
regarded as predefined facts and truths. Because of relative availability, water management has 
more than one truth. 
Water can be regarded as a political tool in Syria in various ways. First, the state can employ 
water as a tool for diplomacy vis-à-vis its riparian neighbors. It can use water as a tool for 
development in its hydraulic mission linked to state-building and power consolidation. And in the 
current Syrian conflict, water can be a military tool. These political possibilities can be exerted 
through water management by the Syrian state. Pragmatic strategies appeared to be central in 
water management, and must be taken into account in debates on human agency vis-à-vis water. 
The most important strategies were issue linkage and strategic alliances at the international level, 
and developmental centralization and development cooperation with international partners at the 
national (and local) level. Besides, water can also be politicized through the diverse discourses. By 
presenting water through a distributional or ecological frame, Syria’s natural water scarcity and 
increasing stresses to water resources due to a combination of population-growth, power 
asymmetry, and climate change could be propagated. Scholars like De Châtel, who has spent years 
of doing research in Syria and spoke to a number of high Syrian officials and ministers, emphasized 
the extreme political sensitivity that surrounded Syrian water management. Agriculture and food 
self-sufficiency were national pride and consequently regarded from a security prism as red lines 
that should not be fumbled with. The cover of this thesis quite literally illustrates this, showing 
agricultural and hydrological practices as pictured on a five hundred and thousand Syrian pound 
bill.   
Despite the here-central national context, water may also be politicized by forces external to 
the state to serve their agendas. Water can be regarded as a possible political tool for the 
international community as well; to pursue a neoliberal agenda aimed at democracy. A heavy 
emphasis on the technical aspects of water management, sometimes coupled with diplomatic 
instruments like Track II initiatives – that strengthen the hegemony of technocrats – or plain 
funding, can in this regard serve as the instruments of the international community. In Syria, 
however, IFIs and other global institutions seem to have had a more limited influence and leverage 
than has been the case in other Middle Eastern countries. Pace Hanieh, the deplorable state of the 
Syrian water sector cannot be entirely contributed to neoliberal pressures and agendas. 
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Nonetheless, the current crisis does attract initiatives from the international community that 
promote capitalism and democracy through proposed reforms that can be labeled as neoliberalist, 
as the last chapter showed. This also applies to the Syrian water sector. 
A question that remains, is who would be responsible for the questionable condition of the 
Syrian water sector. Is it the Syrian government with its domestic economic policies, the 
international community with its capitalist pressures, or the Syrian population with its 
environmentally harmful practices the past fifty years. Or, perhaps, one should rather ask whether 
it is necessary to express value judgments on behalf of the here-examined actors and their agendas. 
Haddad’s critique on the Syrian government’s liberalization is thoroughly grounded in his years of 
research and own experiences in the country. But Hanieh’s criticizing of the international 
community’s neoliberal agenda already is more abstract. This thesis balanced the theoretical and 
the practical, the abstract and the concrete. The question how water can be regarded as rather than 
used as a political tool means installing a somewhat theoretical approach to political water 
management. More abstract ideas on and examples of the politicization of water at different scalar 
levels were matched to more concrete Syrian politics and economic developments. Hence, the 
documents of the SDWC, that provided highly-interesting and much-needed practical insights into 
Syrian water management on the one hand, could on the other hand be regarded as propagating a 
more theoretical, technical, neoliberal agenda. But does that render their mapping of bottlenecks 
and environmental challenges in the Orontes basin less valuable? To what extent has the SDWC 
benefitted some Syrian people in the basin, even if the technical experts were immersed in a 
neoliberal frame of reference? In a different vein, would Syria have been any better off if it had not 
sought to embed itself in the global economy in 2005 but had adhered to original Ba’thist policies? 
And how should we regard the policies of the Dutch government or the UN in the current Syrian 
crisis? If some Syrians are helped in the deplorable current situation, for example through funding 
of clean drinking water projects, should we express judgment on that?    
Most importantly, this thesis has pointed out that there are many possible political 
dynamics to water – it cannot merely be regarded as a natural resource. A sustainable Syrian water 
sector is consequently in the first place a political challenge. Once again, scalar levels are important. 
The local level – the level of Syrian towns and villages, of everyday life, of individual Syrian men and 
women – has been touched upon in the SDWC examination, but has not been theoretically analyzed 
like the national, international, and global level. That is also perhaps unnecessary. Both the SDWC 
and De Châtel have indicated that at the Syrian local level there is mostly no conscious political 
water (mis)management; management policies seem to be more ad hoc decisions partly made 
under Allan’s “veil of ignorance”. There seem to be no particular pragmatic strategies or narratives 
surrounding water in place.260 But this is not to underestimate the importance of everyday practical 
water management “on the ground”. Selby warned in 2005 that conflicts over water were most 
likely to occur at the local level. Haddad wrote recently (March 2015) that ‘the road ahead in these 
bleak times in Syria is one of modest and relatively limited initiatives that are often isolated from 
one another but nonetheless cumulative.’261 Hence, the answer to the question posed by Selby in the 
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 Information based upon talks with Jos de Sonneville (SDWC) on 13 February 2015 and Francesca de Châtel on 5 
March 2015 as well as derived from information in earlier chapters. 
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 Haddad, “No Easy Answers”, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21237/four-years-on_no-easy-answers-in-
syria-(part-ii) . 
69 
 
beginning of this research – whether water can shape, or help to reshape geopolitics in the Middle 
East – can perhaps best be answered by ongoing research into Syrian water management at the 
local level – into past as well as present times.  
 
 A brief concluding side note 
That said, it seems unlikely that small-scale, on-the-ground research in Syria is possible or plausible 
in the near future. I have refrained from predictions on possible outcomes of the Syrian conflict, nor 
have I wished to pose the current conflict as the dominant context or setting of this thesis. In the 
beginning of this thesis I quoted Ranke who argued that the historian must take oneself and one’s 
knowledge into account in one’s writings. From hindsight it is perhaps easy to point to the Syrian 
regime’s agricultural policy mistakes and water mismanagement, or its neoliberal policies as 
incentives to the present situation. These arguments may or may not or may partly be true. What is 
more important, however, is to use one’s comfortable position of sitting at the end of history to 
further explore the political dynamics surrounding water resources and water management in 
Syria as well as in the larger MENA region. I mentioned the built-in bias of my predominantly 
European and American source material. Additional studies into political water management in the 
Middle East – particularly from different angles than the one employed here – are needed to avoid 
such biases. Haddad argued that the relationship between the state and the private sector in Middle 
Eastern countries is fraught with contingencies and constraints; consequently political-economic 
developments in key infrastructural sectors like the water sector must be examined on a case-by-
case basis.262 The roles of different possible actors must be further problematized. Equally, other 
angles and topics, like the water-energy nexus, or the oil-water analogy, which I could 
unfortunately not sufficiently take into account here, need to be researched. Pushing research on 
the (theoretical) political dynamics of water forwards will perhaps contribute to reaching 
sustainable water management at a practical level, that benefits all parties involved.  
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70 
 
Bibliography 
 
Adviesraad voor Internationale Vraagstukken, “Nederland en de Arabische regio: principieel en 
pragmatisch?”, November 2014 . Available (in Dutch) via  http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/publicaties/2015/03/06/advies-nederland-en-de-arabische-regio-principieel-en-
pragmatisch.html; 
Allan, J.A., “Water Security in the Middle East: The Hydro-Politics of Global Solutions”, Analysis by SOAS / 
King’s College London Water Research Group 2003; 
Amery, H.A. and A.T. Wolf, Water in the Middle East. A Geography of Peace (Austin: The University of Texas 
Press 2000); 
ARK, “Countering Violent Extremism: Mapping Extremist Actors in Syria”, Report CTLBC/2239 (November 
2013) 1-31; 
Barnes, J., “Managing the Waters of Ba’th Country: The Politics of Water Scarcity in Syria”, Geopolitics 14 
(2009) 510-530; 
Beaumont, P., “Water Policies for the Middle East in the 21st Century: The New Economic Realities”, 
International Journal of Water Resources Development 18.2 (2002) 315-334; 
Boswell, T. and C. Brown, “The Scope of General Theory: Methods for Linking Deductive and Inductive 
Comparative History”, Sociological Methods and Research 28.2 (1999) 154-185; 
Bouma, G. and K. Roest (SDWC, Ministry of Irrigation, Partners for Water), “Report Mission 3 – Application 
IWRM 16-24 July 2010. Summary of activities, results, and follow-up Mhardeh pilot area” (July 2010) 1-12; 
Bouma, G. and J. de Sonneville (SDWC, Ministry of Irrigation, Partners for Water), “Report Mission 4 – 
Application IWRM 17-23 October 2010. Summary of activities, results, and follow-up Khan Shaykhun pilot 
area” (October 2010) 1-11; 
Bouma, G. and K. Roest (SDWC and Ministry of Irrigation; General Commission for Water Resources), “The 
Application and Introduction of IWRM in the Pilot Areas in the Orontes Basin” (November 2010) i-18; 
Bouma, G.,  J. de Sonneville, K. Roest, “Water en bodem onder druk in Syrië. Nederlandse kennisinstellingen 
actief onder de vlag van SDWC”, Bodem 5 (2011) 12-15; 
Braudel, F., The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II Vol. I and II (Berkeley: 
University of California Press 1995; transl. from French by S. Reynolds [orig. published in France, 1949]); 
 
Briscoe, I., F. Janssen and R. Smits, “Stability and Economic Recovery After Assad: Key Steps for Syria’s Post-
Conflict Transition”, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael paper 2 (November 2012) 1-
53; 
 
Bryman, A., Social Research Methods (4th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
 
Châtel, F. de, ‘‘The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the 
Revolution”, Middle Eastern Studies 50.4 (2014) 521-535; 
--. “Leaving the Land: The Impact of Long-Term Water Mismanagement in Syria”, in: Châtel, F. de, G. 
Holst-Warhaft, T. Steenhuis (eds.), Water Scarcity, Security and Democracy. A Mediterranean Mosaic 
(published by Global Water Partnership Mediterranean, Cornell University and the Atkinson Center for a 
Sustainable Future, 2014) 86-96; 
71 
 
Châtel, F. de and M. Raba’a, “Waterless Wadi Barada. Manufacturing Scarcity in a Syrian River Valley”, Middle 
East Report 271 (2014) 10-17; 
 
Châtel, F. de, G. Holst-Warhaft, T. Steenhuis (eds.), Water Scarcity, Security and Democracy. A Mediterranean 
Mosaic (published by Global Water Partnership Mediterranean, Cornell University and the Atkinson Center 
for a Sustainable Future, 2014). Available via http://www.gwp.org/Global/GWP-
Med%20Files/News%20and%20Activities/VARIOUS/GWP-MED-FINAL-PUBLICATION-
ONLINE_with%20cover.pdf;  
Cleveland, W.L. and M. Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East (Fourth Edition; Philadelphia: Westview 
Press 2009); 
Cooley, J.K., “The War over Water”, Foreign Policy 54 (1984) 3-26; 
Dagge, J., “Parting the Waters”, Syria Today: Focus section (January 2010) 28-32; 
Daoudy, M., “Asymmetric Power: Negotiating Water in the Euphrates and Tigris”, International Negotiation 14 
(2009) 359-389; 
Devlin, J., “Is Water Scarcity Dampening Growth Prospects in the Middle East and North Africa?”, Brookings 24 
June 2014, available via http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/06/24-water-scarcity-growth-
prospects-middle-east-north-africa-devlin#ftnte1;  
Dolyatar, M. and T.S. Gray, “The Politics of Water Scarcity in the Middle East”, Environmental Politics 9.3 
(2000) 65-88; 
Dunreath Newman, S., “The Plight of the Marsh Arabs, and Environmental and Human Rights Crisis. An 
Application of Complexity Theory”, Advances in Nursing Science 30.4 (2007) 315-328; 
Erian, W., B. Katlan and O. Babah, “Drought vulnerability in the Arab region: Special case study: Syria” 
(Geneva: U.N. International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2010) 1-20; 
EU and EEAS, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council; Elements for an EU regional 
strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat”, 9 February 2015. Available via 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties/2015/03/13/fiche-van-de-werkgroep-
beoordeling-nieuwe-commissievoorstellen-bnc.html 
Femia, F. and C.E. Werrell, “Climate Change Before and After the Arab Awakening: The Cases of Syria and 
Libya”, in: C.E. Werrell and F. Femia (eds.), “The Arab Spring and Climate Change. A Climate and Security 
Correlations Series”, Center for American Progress, Stimson, The Center for Climate and Security (February 
2013) 23-33; 
Fisk, R., Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990); 
Gleditsch, N.P., “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature”, Journal of Peace Research 
35.3 (1998) 381-400; 
Gleick, P.H., “Water, War & Peace in the Middle East”, Environment (1994) 6-42; 
--. “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria”, Weather, Climate, and Society (2014) 1-34; 
Gleick, P.H. and M. Heberger, “Water and Conflict. Events, Trends, and Analysis (2011-2012)”, The World’s 
Water 8 (2013) 159-171;  
GTZ and German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Managing Water for 
Sustainable Development. Modernisation of the Syrian Water Sector” (April 2010) 1-20; 
72 
 
Haddad, B., “The Political Economy of Syria: Realities and Challenges”, Middle East Policy 18.2 (Summer 2011) 
46-61; 
--. “Syria’s Stalemate: the Limits of Regime Resilience”, Middle East Policy 19.1 (Spring 2012) 85-95; 
--. Business Networks in Syria. The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 2012); 
--.  “Four Years On: No Easy Answers in Syria”, Jadaliyya (18 and 30 March 2015), available via 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21117/four-years-on_no-easy-answers-in-syria-(part-1) and 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21237/four-years-on_no-easy-answers-in-syria-(part-ii)  
Hage Ali, M., “ISIS’ Path of Destruction Drains Iraq and Syria’s Water Supplies”, Al Arabiya News, 21 June 2014; 
Hammer, J., “Is a Lack of Water to Blame for the Conflict in Syria?”, Smithsonian Magazine, June 2013; 
Hanieh, A., Lineages of Revolt. Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago: Haymarket Books 
2013); 
Hinnebusch, R.A., “Bureaucracy and Development in Syria: The Case of Agriculture”, Journal of Asian and 
African Studies 24 (1989) 79-93; 
--. Syria. Revolution from above (London: Routledge 2001); 
--. “The Ba’th Party in Post-Ba’thist Syria: President, Party, and the Struggle for ‘Reform’”, Middle East 
Critique 20.2 (2011) 109-125; 
--. “Syria: from ‘Authoritarian Upgrading’ to Revolution?”, International Affairs 88.1 (2012) 95-113; 
--. “Documenting the Roots and Dynamics of the Syrian Uprising”, The Middle East Journal 67.3 (Summer 
2013) 467-474; 
Homer-Dixon, T.F., Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton 2001); 
Johnstone, S. and J. Mazo, “Global Warming and the Arab Spring”, in: Werrell, C.E. and F. Femia (eds.), “The 
Arab Spring and Climate Change. A Climate and Security Correlations Series”, Center for American Progress, 
Stimson, The Center for Climate and Security (February 2013) 15-23; 
Jongerden, J., “Dams and Politics in Turkey: Utilizing Water, Developing Conflict”, Middle East Policy Council 
17.1 (2010); 
Kaplan, R.D., The Revenge of Geography.  What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against 
Fate (New York: Random House, Inc. 2012);  
Khalidi, S. al-, “Survivors of Syria’s Hama Massacre Watch and Hope”, Reuters, 7 July 2011, available via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-syria-hama-idUSTRE7665R620110707. 
Kibaroglu, A., “The Role of Epistemic Communities in Offering New Cooperation Frameworks in the 
Euphrates-Tigris Rivers System”, Journal of International Affairs 61.2 (2008) 183-198; 
Kramer, A., “Regional Water Cooperation and Peacebuilding in the Middle East”, Regional Case Study: Middle 
East in: IFP Regional Cooperation on Environment, Economy and Natural Resource Management Cluster, 
Adelphi Research, and Initiative for Peacebuilding (2008) 7-42; 
Kuhn, T., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962); 
Landman, T., Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. An Introduction (Third Edition; London: Routledge 
2008); 
73 
 
Lapidus, I.M., A History of Islamic Societies (Second Edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002); 
Lebow, R.N. and M.I. Lichbach (eds.), Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and International Relations 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007); 
Lefèvre R., Ashes of Hama: the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (New York and London: Oxford University Press 
2013); 
Lockman, Z., Contending Visions of the Middle East. The History and Politics of Orientalism (Second Edition; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010); 
Lorenz, F. and E.J. Erickson, Strategic Water. Iraq and Security Planning in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin (Virginia: 
Marine Corps University Press 2013); 
Lund, A., “Cold Winter Coming: Syria’s Fuel Crisis”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 13 October 
2014; 
Machlis, G.E. and T. Hanson, “Warfare Ecology”, BioScience 58.8 (2008) 729-736; 
Mahoney, J. and G. Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative 
Research,” Political Analysis 14.3 (2006) 227-249; 
 
Marshall, C. and G.B. Rossman. Designing Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks and London: Sage Publications, 
2011); 
 
Massih, N., “ISIS Gains Highlight ‘Aggressive’ Use of Water as Weapon of War”, The Daily Star Lebanon, 21 July 
2014; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Water in de DAM-regio: de Nederlandse inzet 2011-2020” (2011). Unpublished 
policy document; 
--.  “Factsheet: Nederlandse geintegreerde benadering t.a.v. Syrië (September 2014)” . Unpublished 
policy document; 
Mitchell, T., “The Middle East in the Past and Future of Social Science”, in D. Szanton (ed.), The Politics of 
Knowledge. Area Studies and the Disciplines (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 2004) 
74-118; 
Moore, M.-L., “Perspectives of Complexity in Water Governance: Local Experiences of Global Trends”, Water 
Alternatives 6.3 (2013) 487-505; 
Morris, M.E., “Water and Conflict in the Middle East: Threats and Opportunities”, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 20.1 (1997) 1-13;  
Mourad, K.A. and R. Berndtsson, “Syrian Water Resources Between the Present and the Future”, Air, Soil and 
Water Research 4 (2011) 93-100; 
 
National Agricultural Policy Center, “Report 2010”, available via http://www.napcsyr.net/dwnld-
files/periodical_reports/en/sofas_2010_en.pdf; 
 
Nassar, J., “Hama: a Rebirth from the Ashes?”, Middle East Monitor, 11 July 2014. Available via 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/12703-hama-a-rebirth-from-the-ashes ; 
 
Ohlsson, L. (ed.), Hydropolitics. Conflicts over Water as a Development Constraint (London: Zed Books 1995); 
 
Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, “Islamic State Will Use Water as Weapon in Iraq, Syria”, 2 September 2014;  
 
74 
 
Pohl, B. et. al., Report Climate Diplomacy (collaboration German Federal Foreign Office and Adelphi, a Berlin-
based think tank), “The Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy. Strengthening Foreign Policy for Transboundary Waters” 
(PRINTPRINZ GmbH 2014) 1-46; 
 
Rogers, P. and P. Lydon (eds.), Water in the Arab World. Perspectives and Prognoses (Harvard University 
1994); 
 
Sadiki, L., “Syria: the Revenge of Hama, 30 Years On”, Al-Jazeera, 3 February 2012. Available online via 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/20122382325175537.html  
 
Sageman, M., Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2004); 
 
Sayigh, Y., “What Will Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State Do Next in Syria?”, Al-Hayat, 20 November 2014, 
available via http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/11/20/what-will-jabhat-al-nusra-and-islamic-state-do-next-in-
syria/hux4; 
 
--. “The Assad Regime’s Political “Achilles Heel””, Al-Hayat, 11 December 2014, available via  
http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/11/assad-regime-s-political-achilles-heel/hwdw;  
 
Schuurman, B. and Q. Eijkman, “Moving Terrorism Research Forward: the Crucial Role of Primary Sources”, 
ICCT Background Note (June 2013) 1-11; 
 
Syrian Dutch Water Cooperation (SDWC), “Note on the Reconnaissance Surveys to the Irrigated Areas in the 
River Euphrate and River Khabour Valleys, 7-9 November 2009” (2009) 1-14; 
 
--. “Pleidooi”, 2010; 
 
--. “Position Paper: Integrated Water Resources Management in Syria: Policies, Decision-Making and 
Organisation” (November 2010) 1-17; 
 
--. “Status report on SDWC rounding-off activities due to the temporarily postponement of the 
programme as per 30 May 2011” (December 2011) i-32; 
 
Seale, P., Asad of Syria. The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988); 
 
Selby, J., “The Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East: Fantasies and Realities”, Third World Quarterly 26.2 
(2005) 329-349; 
--. “Oil and Water: The Contrasting Anatomies of Resource Conflict”, Government and Opposition Ltd 
(2005) 200-224; 
Shamali, O. and Homs Directorate of Water Resources, Integrated Water Resource Management Plan Orontes 
Basin; 
Smets, S., “Draft: Baseline Water Sector Report”, GTZ Modernization of the Syrian Water Sector Support to 
Sector Planning and Coordination and State Planning Commission, Damascus (June 2009) i-148; 
Sonneville, J. de and W. Seif, “Integrated Water Resources Management as a Framework for Regional Planning 
in Syria: Policies, Decision-Making, and Organisation” (2011) 1-11; 
Sowers, J. and C. Toensing, “Editor’s Note”, Middle East Report s Vol. 40 number 254 (Spring 2010); 
Sowers, J., “Water, Energy and Human Insecurity in the Middle East”, Middle East Reports vol. 44 number 271 
(Summer 2014); 
Stake, R.E., The Art of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks and London: Sage Publications 1995);  
75 
 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies Geneva, Report “Syria: the Impact of the Conflict on Population Displacement, Water, 
and Agriculture in the Orontes River Basin”, February 2014, 1-24; 
Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), “The Syrian Regime Is Using Water Cutting as a Weapon of War”, 
Report 20 September 2014; 
--.  “Dropping of Euphrates River Level Threatening Thousands of Residents”, Report 25 June 2014; 
Trevor Roper, H.R., “Fernand Braudel, the Annales, and the Mediterranean”, Journal of Modern History 44.4 
(1972) 468-479;  
Tripp, C., A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000); 
Trumbull IV, G.R.,  “Speaking of Water”, Middle East Report Vol. 40 nr. 254 (Spring 2010); 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) and Bundesanstalt fur 
Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR), “Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia” (Beirut 
2013) 12-26, 224-243; 
UN-ESCWA Work Group Water, “Framework Water Sector Input. National Agenda for the Future of Syria” 
(December 2014); 
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), “Syria Crisis Executive Brief”, September 2014, 
available via 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/FAO_Syria%20crisis_ExecutiveBrief_15%20
09%202014.pdf 
Veen, E. van and I. Abdo, “Between Brutality and Fragmentation: Options for Addressing the Syrian Civil War”, 
Conflict Research Unit Report, Clingendael: The Hague (2014); 
 
Veen, E. van and N. Grinstead, “Iraqi imbroglio: the Islamic State and beyond. A brief analysis of the 2014 
political-security crisis”, Crisis Research Unit Report (November 2014) 1-30; 
 
Vidal, J., “Water Supply Key to Outcome of Conflicts in Iraq and Syria, Experts Warn”, The Guardian, 2 July 
2014; 
Warner, J.F. and M. Zeitoun, “International relations theory and water do mix: A response to Furlong’s 
troubled waters, hydrohegemony and international water relations”, Political Geography 27 (2008) 202-210; 
Williams, R.C., The Historian’s Toolbox. A Student’s Guide to the Theory and Craft of History (Armonk and 
London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2007 [second ed.]); 
Wolf, A.T. and J.T. Newton, “Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin”, 
Research by Oregon State University: Institute for Water and Watersheds (2007); 
World Bank Report, “From Scarcity to Security: Averting a Water Crisis in the Middle East and North Africa” 
(December 1995) 1-32; 
Worth, R.F., “In Mideast, a Drought of Biblical Proportions”, New York Times (23 October 2010). 
 
 Links in thesis (in order of appearance) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-state-jihadists-are-using-water-as-a-weapon-
in-iraq/2014/10/06/aead6792-79ec-4c7c-8f2f-fd7b95765d09_story.html 
76 
 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/11/20/what-will-jabhat-al-nusra-and-islamic-state-do-next-in-syria/hux4 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/11/assad-regime-s-political-achilles-heel/hwdw 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=56917 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/water-war-syria-euphrates-
2014757640320663.html 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/14959 
http://iswsyria.blogspot.nl/?utm_source=Syria+Update:+December+9-
16,+2014&utm_campaign=ISW+New+Syria+update&utm_medium=email.   
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer254 
http://www2.worldwater.org/conflict/list/ 
http://www2.worldwater.org/conflict/map/ 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21237/four-years-on_no-easy-answers-in-syria-(part-ii)  
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/SYR/SYR-map_detailed.pdf  
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/12703-hama-a-rebirth-from-the-ashes  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/20122382325175537.html 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-syria-hama-idUSTRE7665R620110707 
http://www.bilaterals.org/?-GAFTA-&lang=en 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/26/international/middleeast/26cnd-lebanon.html?_r=0 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html   
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/29/us-syria-crisis-refugees-idUSKBN0GT0AX20140829  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/middleeast/un-raises-estimate-of-dead-in-syrian-conflict-to-
191000.html 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/bashar-al-assad-winds-reelection-in-landslide-victory 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21117/four-years-on_no-easy-answers-in-syria-(part-1)  
 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21237/four-years-on_no-easy-answers-in-syria-(part-ii)  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50458#.VS9sMZSsVNU 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/22/the-coming-water-wars/ 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/595616/Tigris-Euphrates-river-system  
http://waterinventory.org/sites/waterinventory.org/files/chapters/Chapter-01-Euphrates-River-Basin-
web.pdf  
http://waterinventory.org/sites/waterinventory.org/files/chapters/Chapter-03-Tigris_River-Basin-
web_0.pdf 
77 
 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/SYR/index.stm 
http://acc.teachmideast.org/map.php?module_id=4&country_id=11 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17868325 
http://francescadechatel.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Out_of_its_Depth.pdf 
http://waterinventory.org/surface_water/orontes-river-basin 
http://www.napcsyr.net/dwnld-files/periodical_reports/en/sofas_2010_en.pdf 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/SYR/index.stm 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55376 
http://www.partnersvoorwater.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PvWNieuwsbrief1-2011.pdf  
http://www.deltares.nl/media/views/2010/3/content/collect_pdf.pdf 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=146 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/defining-the-international-community-s-role-and-
responsibility-by-michel-rocard 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/24/whatthehellistheinternationalcommunity 
http://www.syrianpppconference.org/ 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2014/10/11/nederland-en-wereldbank-pakken-waterproblemen-
aan.html  
http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2024314-wereldprimeur-nederland-benoemt-watergezant.html 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties/2015/03/06/advies-nederland-en-de-
arabische-regio-principieel-en-pragmatisch.html 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties/2015/03/13/fiche-van-de-werkgroep-
beoordeling-nieuwe-commissievoorstellen-bnc.html 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/FAO_Syria%20crisis_ExecutiveBrief_15%20
09%202014.pdf 
http://www.escwa.un.org/sites/ESAR/project.asp?ProjectTitle=The%20National%20Agenda%20for%20the
%20Future%20of%20Syria 
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/30/al-qaida-plans-its-next-move-yemen-300782.html 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/may/27/libya-water-hidden-weapon . 
 
 Websites 
Carnegie Endowment: http://carnegieendowment.org/about  
78 
 
Chatham House : http://www.chathamhouse.org/about 
CIA Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/SY.html 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bz Pacific Institute: 
http://worldwater.org/about-us/ 
Institute for the Study of War: http://understandingwar.org/  
Syrian Five Year Plans: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/SYR/00049469/implementing%20FYP.pdf  
Syrian Network for Human Rights: http://sn4hr.org/  
Syrian Opposition Coalition: http://www.etilaf.org/ 
UN-ESCWA: http://waterinventory.org 
UN-FAO Aquastat: http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm 
 
 Maps and figures 
Figure front page. http://www.banquecentrale.gov.sy/main-eg.htm 
Figure 1. http://www.geographicguide.com/asia/maps/syria.htm  
Figure 2. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/SYR/SYR-map_detailed.pdf  
Figure 3. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/595616/Tigris-Euphrates-river-system  
Figure 4. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/SYR/index.stm 
Figure 5. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/syr/Figures.htm  
Figure 6. http://acc.teachmideast.org/map.php?module_id=4&country_id=11 
Figure 7. SDWC Document (2008) 
 
 
 
 
